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covering the period 1989-2005. The evidence suggests that there are 
no signs of a consistent pattern of reduction in labor informality in the 
region. Regardless of the definition used, labor informality remains a 
pervasive characteristic of labor markets in LAC. In several countries 
the increase in labor informality seems to have been associated more 
to a sizeable increase in the propensity to set informal arrangements 
within groups, than to changes in the national employment structure 
toward more informal sectors.
Key words: informality, employment, Latin America, Caribbean, labor 
market.
JEL Classification: J01, J21, J31, J42, J8.
Resumen 
Este artículo documenta los principales patrones y tendencias de 
definiciones alternativas de informalidad laboral en América Latina 
y el Caribe (ALC), explotando una base de datos de más de 100 en-
cuestas de hogares en el período 1989-2005. El trabajo no encuentra 
evidencia empírica a favor de un patrón consistente de reducción de la 
informalidad laboral en la región. Independientemente de la definición 
usada, la informalidad continúa siendo una característica dominante 
de los mercados laborales en ALC. En varios países el incremento 
en la informalidad laboral parece estar asociado más a un importante 
aumento en la propensión a fijar arreglos informales en todos los sec-
tores productivos, que a cambios en la estructura nacional de empleo 
hacia actividades más informales.
Palabras clave: informalidad, empleo, América Latina, Caribe, mer-
cado laboral.
Clasificación JEL: J01, J21, J31, J42, J8.
Introduction 
Academics, policy-makers and commentators have extensively argued 




and the adequate policy prescriptions. The debate, however, is often 
obscured by the fact that the term informality is ambiguous from a 
theoretical point of view, and difficult to implement empirically1. 
Labor informality usually means different things to different people. 
While some researchers associate informal labor to low-productivity 
marginal jobs, others prefer to limit the concept to employment not 
complying with the legal norms in terms of labor taxes, regulations, 
and social protection.
 
This paper makes a contribution to the analysis of labor informality in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) by presenting evidence on the 
main patterns and trends of alternative definitions of informal labor. In 
particular, we implement a “productive” definition for which informal 
workers are those in low-productivity jobs in marginal small-scale 
and often family-based activities, and a “legalistic/social protection” 
definition for which informal workers are those with no access to social 
protection or right to certain labor benefits. 
The evidence presented in this paper is based on microdata from a large 
set of more than 100 household surveys covering the period 1989-2005, 
taken from the Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (SEDLAC), a project jointly developed by CEDLAS at the 
Universidad Nacional de La Plata and the World Bank’s LAC poverty 
group. This database allows us to provide a broad picture of the main 
trends and patterns of labor informality in LAC, and hence, hopefully, 
contributes to a better informed debate on this issue in the region.
The study of labor informality has a long tradition in the economics 
literature in Latin America. Most of the studies, however, are limited 
to a single definition of informality and restricted to one country or 
a small set of economies. The aggregation of this large set of studies 
into a survey that provides a unified body of evidence is difficult, as 
individual researchers construct variables from household surveys in 
different ways, and take different methodological decisions, many of 
them not reported in the papers. 
1  In this paper the term informality always refer to labor informality. There is a large litera-
ture that studies the broader issue of the informal or shadow economy. See, for instance, 
Schneider and Enste (2000) who measure the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing, 
transition, and OECD countries using various methods. 16
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This article contributes to the study of labor informality in LAC by pro-
viding, for the whole region, an extensive set of statistics for alternative 
definitions of informality, constructed by applying similar definitions 
and methodologies across countries. The paper is mostly descriptive: 
it offers a broad view of labor informality in the region, without at-
tempting to get deep into its determinants. However, by showing the 
results of correlations, multivariate regressions and microsimulations, 
the paper provides useful preliminary evidence that helps to think about 
labor informality, and hopefully, motivates future research. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the 
concept of labor informality, the alternatives to empirically estimate 
it, and proposes specific implementations with the information avail-
able in the national household surveys of the region. In particular, we 
implement a productive definition of labor informality associated to 
the type of job, and a legalistic definition associated to the access to 
social protection linked to the employment. 
Section II is the core of the paper, as it presents the main patterns and 
trends of labor informality at the country level using alternative defi-
nitions. Most unskilled workers in LAC are informal for any of the 
definitions. They are self-employed or salaried workers in small firms 
without a signed contract in compliance with labor regulations, and 
without access to social protection and labor related benefits. In fact, 
that is also the labor condition for a sizeable share of skilled workers 
in the region. This situation does not seem to be the consequence only 
of economic stagnation. Despite a positive performance during some 
periods, most countries in the region have not experienced significant 
increases in the share of workers in the formal sector. Labor informal-
ity remains a pervasive characteristic of labor markets in LAC. The 
incidence of this phenomenon substantially differs across countries 
(e.g. from 70% in Bolivia and Paraguay to 40% in Chile, according 
to the productive definition). 
In section III we look at wages and hours of work of informal work-
ers. In particular, we provide estimates of the conditional wage gap of 
being informal. On average, informal (in the productive sense) male 




counterparts. In nearly all countries salaried workers without social 
protection also earn substantially less than formal salaried workers. 
In contrast, hours of work do not differ much across groups. Entre-
preneurs and large-firms employees work in general more hours than 
in the public sector, while hours of work are approximately the same 
for the rest of the groups.
Section IV takes a look at changes in informality over the business cy-
cle to assess whether informal employment moves pro or anti-cyclically 
with the economy and relative wages across sectors. We find that in 
the recessions informality increased along with a fall in relative wages. 
However, the symmetric story for the economic expansions did not 
take place: in several LAC economies informality also increased during 
periods of strong GDP growth. The evidence of increasing informality 
both in expansions and downturns in several countries is challenging 
as it calls for explanations that go beyond the economic cycle. 
Section V is aimed at characterizing changes in labor informality at 
the country level over time. A given increase in the level of labor in-
formality in an economy could be the consequence of either a change 
in the structure of employment in favor of groups with high propensity 
to informal arrangements (e.g. unskilled services), or a generalized in-
crease in the propensity to informality for all groups. We examine this 
issue by applying a microeconometric decomposition methodology. We 
find that in some South American countries the growth in informality is 
mainly associated to a sizeable increase in the propensity to informality 
in most groups, and not to a change in the employment structure. El 
Salvador is the only country in our sample where a fall in informality 
is driven entirely by a change in the employment structure.
In section VI we carry out some counterfactual simulations to char-
acterize the differences in informality across countries. In particular, 
we compare the actual informality rate in a given country to the coun-
terfactual rate that would arise if that country “imported” only the 
observable characteristics of some other economy. The results of the 
decompositions can be used to assess scenarios under which a country 
may reduce informality. 
Section VII closes with some brief concluding comments. 18
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I.   Measuring labor informality 
There are at least two different concepts that are referred by the term 
labor informality2. The “productive” definition pictures informal 
workers as those in low-productivity, unskilled, marginal jobs, while 
the “legalistic” or “social protection” definition stresses the lack of 
labor protection and social security benefits3. It is important to make 
clear from the outset that the definitions do not correspond to compet-
ing views about informality, with different welfare implications and 
policy prescriptions. Instead, they refer to different phenomena in the 
labor market. The productive definition is concerned with the type 
of job (e.g. salaried vs. self-employed, large vs. small firms), while 
the legalistic definition is concern with the compliance of the labor 
relationship with some rules, mainly labor protection. We follow the 
tradition of using the same term informality to refer to these two dif-
ferent aspects of the labor market. 
The “productive” view classifies as informal those workers in low-
productivity jobs in marginal small-scale and often family-based activi-
ties. ILO (1991) defines the informal sector as economic units “with 
scarce or even no capital, using primitive technologies and unskilled 
labor, and then with low productivity”. Maloney (2004) includes in the 
informal sector the “small-scale, semi-legal, often low-productivity, 
frequently family-based, perhaps pre-capitalistic enterprises”. 
Naturally, it is very difficult to empirically implement this notion, 
since things like “productivity” are unobservable, others like “capital 
endowment” are not usually reported in surveys, while others like 
“marginal”, “pre-capitalistic activities” or “primitive technologies” are 
difficult to define. In practice researchers have tried to adjust this notion 
of informality to the information usually contained in surveys. Hence, 
the empirical implementation of informality has been linked to (i) the 
type of job (salaried, self-employment), (ii) the type of economic unit 
(small, large, public sector), (iii) and the worker’s skills. Following 
2  See Fields (1990), Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom (2006), Maloney (1999), Perry 
et al. (2007) Portes and Schauffler (1993), Pradhan and van Soest (1995), Saavedra and 
Chong (1999), for surveys and discussions.
3  In recent volume, Guha-Khasnobis et al. (2006) also link informality to the degree of 




this practice we divide the working population into seven groups: (1) 
Entrepreneurs (patrones), (2) Salaried workers in large private firms, 
(3) Salaried workers in the public sector, (4) Salaried workers in small 
private firms, (5) Skilled self-employed, (6) Unskilled self-employed 
and (7) Zero-income workers. 
To implement this classification we include as unskilled all individu-
als without a tertiary or superior education degree, and we define as 
small all firms with 5 or fewer employees4. Given that an individual 
could have more than one job, we apply the classification only to his/
her main occupation. We implement the following definition of labor 
informality: 
Definition 1 (productive definition): An individual is considered 
an informal worker if (s)he belongs to any of the following 
categories: (i) unskilled self-employed, (ii) salaried worker in 
a small private firm, (iii) zero-income worker. 
Labor informality is closely related to self-employment. However, we 
exclude the self-employed with a tertiary degree from the group of 
informal workers. The group of skilled self-employed is mainly com-
prised by professionals and technicians usually with high productivity 
and fully incorporated into the modern economy. In fact, the profes-
sional self-employed is the group with the highest earnings in most 
countries in the region (see section III). Following a standard practice, 
we include salaried workers in small firms into the definition of in-
formality. The assumption, which of course is debatable, is that most 
salaried workers in those firms operate using primitive technologies 
and with low productivity. In fact, many of these small firms are run 
by individuals who declare themselves being self-employed. Finally, 
we also add the group of zero-income workers into the informal sector. 
Household surveys in the region have this category to include mostly 
family workers, i.e. individuals who perform some activity in a family-
based enterprise but who are not formally paid for that job. 
The inclusion of patrones (entrepreneurs/employers) into the formal 
sector is debatable, since in practice some of them are just self-em-
4  Given differences in surveys, the cut-off point is not 5 employees in all countries. See our 
companion paper (Gasparini and Tornarolli, 2006) for details.20
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ployed in a low-productivity activity using scarce capital and some 
few unskilled workers. There are two practical problems regarding this 
group: (i) it is difficult (probably impossible) in theory to set a line 
separating out the entrepreneurs from just the self-employed employing 
some workers, and (ii) even when we attempt to do it, there are some 
data limitations. For instance, most surveys do not report the number 
of employees working for a patrón. We have decided to include the 
patrones into the formal sector following a usual practice, and because 
earnings in that group are much higher than for the self-employed in 
all LAC countries5. 
This discussion confirms that the productive definition of labor 
informality is theoretically weak and empirically difficult to imple-
ment. However, it has lasted for decades and it is extensively used 
in the academic and policy debate, because it refers, although in an 
ambiguous way, to a relevant characteristic of the labor markets in 
Latin America. 
Although having statistics (and hence a definition of) labor informality 
is sometimes useful, in many of the following sections we work with 
the seven categories defined above separately. For many uses the binary 
formal/informal definition implies too much aggregation. Also, in some 
cases we find useful to stress the distinction self-employed-salaried 
workers, instead of the formal-informal grouping discussed above. 
A second strand of the literature has stressed the “legalistic” or “so-
cial protection” notion of informality. Informal firms are those not 
complying with the norms in terms of labor contracts, labor taxes, 
and labor regulations, and then their workers have no rights to labor 
protection or social benefits linked to employment. ILO (2002) defines 
an informal worker as one “whose labor relationship is not subject to 
labor legislation and tax rules, and has no access to social protection 
or right to certain labor benefits”6. 
This second notion is also difficult to implement. There are at least two 
severe problems. The first one arises from the fact that the number of 
5  Gasparini and Tornarolli (2006) show that most results are robust to the change in the clas-
sification of patrones. 
6  See also Merrick (1976), Portes, Blitzner and Curtis (1986) and Saavedra and Chong 




dimensions to be included under labor protection and social security is 
large and varies across countries. Labor protection includes contracts, 
severance payments, advance notice, right to be unionized, workplace 
safety, vacations, working hours and many more. Social security in-
cludes pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance and other 
insurances and benefits. Countries differ in the extent of their labor 
protection and social security systems. Moreover, even in a given 
country regulations and social security rights differ by sector, by tenure, 
or other work characteristics, and change over time. Therefore, it is 
difficult in theory to come up with a legalistic definition of a formal 
worker that is suitable for all countries and situations. 
The second problem is practical. Even if we agree to a simple defini-
tion of an informal worker (e.g. signed contract and right to pensions 
when retired), household surveys widely differ in terms of coverage 
of labor protection and social security issues. Some surveys ask about 
contracts and some do not. The type of questions aimed at capturing 
the right to health insurance is very different across countries, and 
in some cases it is impossible to know whether health insurance is 
linked to employment. The coverage on severance payments and un-
employment insurance is very low, while the questions on insurance 
for accidents in the workplace are almost inexistent. In fact many LAC 
countries do not have comprehensive systems of insurances on many 
risks (including unemployment), so the National Statistical Offices do 
not include questions on these issues. 
The right to receive a pension when retired is the social security benefit 
most asked in LAC household surveys. However, not all countries have 
questions on this item, and in those that have, questions are different. 
Moreover, in most countries the questions apply only to salaried work-
ers, leaving all the self-employed as missing. In this paper we imple-
ment the following legalistic/social-protection definition of informality: 
Definition 2 (legalistic or social protection definition): A sala-
ried worker is informal if s(he) does not have the right to a 
pension linked to employment when retired. 
Table 1 shows the specific social-protection definition of labor in-
formality adopted in each country with relevant information in its 
household survey.22
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Table 1.   Social protection (legalistic) definition of labor formality. 
Country A worker is formal if she ..
Argentina has the right to a pension when retired
Bolivia (since2000) is affiliated with a AFP (Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones)
Brazil  contributes to the Social Security system
Chile  is affiliated with any social security system
Colombia (ENH) has the right to a pension when retired
Ecuador (ECV) has the right to a pension when retired
El Salvador is affiliated with any social security system (no information for domes-
tic servants)
Guatemala contributes to the IGSS (Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social)
Mexico (since 2000) has the right to a pension when retired
Nicaragua contributes to the INSS (Instituto Nicaragüense de Seguridad Social)
Paraguay is affiliated with any social security system
Peru (since 1999) is affiliated with any social security system




has the right to social benefits or social insurance IVSS
has the right to social benefits
The productive and social protection definitions of informality are 
surely highly correlated. However, as mentioned above, we do not 
keep one and discard the other in this study, since we are interested 
in the two definitions for different conceptual reasons. The next sec-
tion shows statistics on both definitions and discusses the possible 
overlapping. 
II. Labor informality: patterns and trends 
In this section we document the structure and patterns of informality 
under the two definitions discussed above. But first we introduce the 




A.   The data 
All the statistics in this paper are obtained by processing microdata 
from household surveys, and are part of the Socioeconomic Database 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), jointly developed 
by CEDLAS at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata and the World 
Bank’s LAC poverty group (LCSPP). The SEDLAC contains informa-
tion on more than 100 household surveys in 21 LAC countries. Table 
2 lists the surveys used in the study. The sample covers all countries 
in mainland Latin America, and four of the largest countries in the 
Caribbean (Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Suriname). In 
each period the sample represents around 93% of LAC total popula-
tion. Most household surveys included in the sample are nationally 
representative. The three exceptions are Argentina and Uruguay, where 
surveys cover only urban population which nonetheless represents 
more than 85% of the total population in both countries, and Suriname, 
where the survey is restricted to the city of Paramaribo (around 50% 
of the population of the country). 
Household surveys are not uniform across LAC countries. The issue 
of comparability is of a great concern. We have made all possible 
efforts to make statistics comparable across countries and over time 
by using similar definitions of variables in each country/year, and by 
applying consistent methods of processing the data. However, perfect 
comparability is far from being assured. A trade-off between accu-
racy and coverage arises. The particular solution adopted contains an 
unavoidable degree of arbitrariness. We tried to be ambitious enough 
to include all countries in the analysis, and accurate enough so not to 
push the comparisons too much. In any case, we provide the reader 
with relevant information to assess the trade-offs7. 
B.   Informality I (“productive” definition)
Table 3 reports information on the share of workers in each of the seven 
categories defined above according to the type of work. Although the 
employment structures are roughly similar across countries, there are 
some relevant differences. Several countries have around 30% of their 
7  Information is provided throughout this paper and in the SEDLAC webpage. 24
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Table 2.   Household surveys in LAC. Characteristics.
Country Name of survey Acronym Years Coverage
Argentina Encuesta Permanente de Hogares








Bolivia Encuesta Integrada de Hogares
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo 










Brazil Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domicilios
PNAD 1990-2003 National
Chile Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconó-
mica Nacional
CASEN 1990-2003 National
Colombia Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza 
de Trabajo
ENH-FT 1992 Urban
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza 
de Trabajo
ENH-FT 1996-2000 National
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2000-2004 National
Encuesta de Calidad de Vida ECV 2003 National
Costa Rica Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos 
Múltiples
EHPM 1992-2003 National
Dominican R. Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 1996-2004 National
Ecuador Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida








El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos 
Múltiples
EHPM 1991-2003 National
Guatemala Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones 
de Vida







Haiti Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie en 
Haïti
ECVH 2001 National
Honduras Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de 
Propósitos Múltiples
EPHPM 1992-2003 National
Jamaica Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions JSLC 1990-2002 National
Mexico Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos 
de los Hogares
ENIGH 1992-2002 National
Nicaragua Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre 
Medición de Nivel de Vida
EMNV 1993-2001 National
Panama Encuesta de Hogares EH 1995-2003 National
Paraguay Encuesta Integrada de Hogares
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares










Peru Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 1997-2003 National
Suriname Expenditure Household Survey EHS 1999 Urban/
Paramaribo
Uruguay Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 1989-2004 Urban
Venezuela  Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo EHM 1989-2003 National
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workers in large firms. That share is lower in less developed and more 
rural countries. Public sector employees are more than 10% of the 
labor force in the most developed countries of the region: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, 
Uruguay and Venezuela8. Self-employed professionals are a minor-
ity in LAC. Only in Argentina, they represent more than 3% of total 
employment. In contrast, the unskilled self-employed are a sizeable 
group in all countries. In fact, it is the largest group in Bolivia, Co-
lombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. More rural countries have 
a large size of their population as zero-income workers. That is the 
case of Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay and Peru9. 
Figure 1 shows a substantial dispersion in informality rates across 
countries. While the share of informal workers according to the 
productive definition is above 70% in Bolivia and Paraguay, the cor-
responding share is below 40% in Chile. Labor informality seems 
negatively related to per capita GDP (at PPP) and positively related 
to the share of rural population in the survey (figure 2). However, 
when including both variables in a simple OLS regression, the latter 
becomes non-significant. 
Labor informality has not changed much in the region (see figure 3 and 
table 4). Only Brazil and Chile have experienced drops in the share 
of informal workers. In the rest of the countries, informality either in-
creased or did not significantly change. Colombia, Honduras, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela seem to have experienced a 
sizeable increase in the share of informal workers, according to the 
productive definition. That has occurred mainly in correspondence 
with a fall in the share of workers in large firms. The share of infor-
mal workers has not changed much in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador and El Salvador.
8  That happens also in the city of Paramaribo (the only city included in the household survey 
of Suriname). 
9  The employment structure does not dramatically change when restricting the analysis to 
only urban areas. The main differences are the higher share of workers in large firms and 
the public sector in urban areas, and the higher share of unskilled self-employed and, in 




Figure 1.  Share of informal workers (productive definition).     
Last available survey.
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
Figure 2.  Scatterplot informality – per capita GDP and share of rural po-
pulation in household survey. Last available survey.
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).30
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Figure 3.  Share of informal workers (productive definition).




Table 4.   Share of informal workers (productive definition).
Adults (25-64) Youths (15-24)
Age Gender Education Area Gender
Total (15-24) (25-64) (65 +) Female Male Low Medium High Rural Urban Female Male
Argentina
EPH-15 cities
1995 0,422 0,496 0,397 0,634 0,440 0,370 0,546 0,410 0,123 0,397 0,506 0,489
1996 0,435 0,517 0,408 0,654 0,440 0,388 0,584 0,422 0,139 0,408 0,518 0,516
1997 0,417 0,480 0,395 0,593 0,423 0,377 0,566 0,399 0,140 0,395 0,478 0,481
1998 0,416 0,481 0,393 0,586 0,424 0,371 0,567 0,409 0,134 0,393 0,491 0,475
EPH-28 cities
1998 0,428 0,504 0,402 0,613 0,432 0,383 0,571 0,420 0,141 0,402 0,523 0,492
1999 0,432 0,510 0,405 0,643 0,438 0,383 0,587 0,424 0,143 0,405 0,499 0,518
2000 0,442 0,515 0,419 0,650 0,439 0,405 0,592 0,450 0,154 0,419 0,512 0,517
2001 0,446 0,542 0,420 0,626 0,431 0,413 0,606 0,449 0,162 0,420 0,563 0,528
2003 0,448 0,581 0,419 0,580 0,408 0,427 0,634 0,467 0,155 0,419 0,572 0,587
EPH-C
2003-II  0,464 0,578 0,433 0,614 0,455 0,418 0,646 0,507 0,170 0,433 0,588 0,572
2004-I 0,453 0,582 0,416 0,645 0,440 0,400 0,615 0,482 0,168 0,416 0,616 0,561
2004-II 0,445 0,547 0,414 0,647 0,438 0,397 0,616 0,463 0,147 0,414 0,608 0,510
2005-I 0,441 0,520 0,415 0,635 0,450 0,390 0,616 0,462 0,155 0,413 0,556 0,499
Bolivia
Urban
1993 0,584 0,690 0,532 0,677 0,664 0,433 0,735 0,560 0,158 0,532 0,814 0,579
1997 0,572 0,642 0,535 0,705 0,658 0,442 0,766 0,578 0,183 0,535 0,772 0,539
2002 0,655 0,712 0,613 0,797 0,715 0,529 0,797 0,643 0,209 0,613 0,807 0,631
National
1997 0,755 0,798 0,693 0,876 0,800 0,611 0,858 0,594 0,177 0,875 0,563 0,878 0,734
2000 0,765 0,792 0,715 0,944 0,787 0,658 0,895 0,632 0,196 0,923 0,592 0,838 0,756
2002 0,769 0,816 0,708 0,883 0,796 0,638 0,848 0,660 0,208 0,863 0,613 0,871 0,775
Brazil
1992 0,583 0,615 0,531 0,834 0,590 0,492 0,646 0,275 0,049 0,861 0,435 0,640 0,599
1993 0,580 0,611 0,530 0,834 0,589 0,490 0,646 0,286 0,053 0,844 0,440 0,633 0,597
1995 0,588 0,617 0,542 0,831 0,598 0,504 0,665 0,302 0,056 0,857 0,455 0,643 0,601
1996 0,577 0,604 0,537 0,833 0,577 0,510 0,662 0,317 0,061 0,842 0,456 0,617 0,597
1997 0,578 0,603 0,539 0,827 0,586 0,507 0,669 0,319 0,066 0,848 0,456 0,626 0,589
1998 0,571 0,595 0,532 0,824 0,571 0,506 0,666 0,326 0,064 0,827 0,454 0,603 0,590
1999 0,581 0,610 0,542 0,825 0,582 0,513 0,679 0,333 0,067 0,831 0,464 0,627 0,600
2001 0,554 0,567 0,525 0,807 0,566 0,495 0,675 0,330 0,066 0,858 0,458 0,574 0,562
2002 0,552 0,570 0,521 0,818 0,560 0,492 0,678 0,332 0,066 0,862 0,454 0,578 0,565
2003 0,550 0,566 0,522 0,807 0,561 0,493 0,684 0,345 0,064 0,859 0,456 0,571 0,563
Chile
1990 0,422 0,423 0,413 0,658 0,471 0,385 0,583 0,383 0,106 0,569 0,383 0,471 0,398
1994 0,404 0,372 0,400 0,658 0,465 0,367 0,572 0,379 0,093 0,568 0,373 0,413 0,349
1996 0,380 0,343 0,376 0,606 0,438 0,344 0,557 0,365 0,084 0,545 0,350 0,386 0,320
1998 0,383 0,341 0,380 0,611 0,449 0,342 0,578 0,375 0,101 0,584 0,352 0,358 0,331
2000 0,369 0,337 0,362 0,602 0,434 0,321 0,554 0,374 0,084 0,550 0,337 0,385 0,308
2003 0,370 0,329 0,364 0,634 0,429 0,324 0,571 0,381 0,088 0,540 0,341 0,367 0,30532
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Table 4.   Share of informal workers (productive definition) (continued).
Adults (25-64) Youths (15-24)
Age Gender Education Area Gender
Total (15-24) (25-64) (65 +) Female Male Low Medium High Rural Urban Female Male
Colombia
ENH-Urban
1992 0,490 0,527 0,476 0,718 0,503 0,472 0,678 0,519 0,189 0,476 0,458 0,497
2000 0,532 0,565 0,517 0,740 0,532 0,523 0,739 0,586 0,224 0,517 0,505 0,538
ENH-
National
1996 0,562 0,578 0,545 0,762 0,564 0,544 0,719 0,541 0,182 0,638 0,503 0,497 0,557
1999 0,590 0,614 0,571 0,777 0,588 0,571 0,747 0,595 0,182 0,661 0,531 0,539 0,597
2000 0,591 0,617 0,568 0,778 0,593 0,561 0,731 0,598 0,205 0,635 0,537 0,550 0,603
ECH-Urban
2000 0,542 0,584 0,524 0,732 0,554 0,514 0,735 0,584 0,221 0,524 0,526 0,556
2004 0,571 0,616 0,548 0,774 0,584 0,532 0,777 0,626 0,185 0,548 0,565 0,589
ECH-
National
2004 0,610 0,642 0,584 0,789 0,623 0,567 0,779 0,629 0,184 0,714 0,548 0,609 0,604
Costa Rica 
1992 0,418 0,402 0,405 0,773 0,429 0,396 0,509 0,317 0,113 0,487 0,318 0,383 0,411
1997 0,443 0,445 0,421 0,718 0,454 0,405 0,543 0,317 0,120 0,500 0,334 0,444 0,445
2000 0,449 0,449 0,435 0,715 0,468 0,419 0,547 0,350 0,135 0,511 0,363 0,458 0,444
2001 0,426 0,439 0,404 0,721 0,457 0,374 0,534 0,340 0,107 0,503 0,348 0,453 0,431




1996 0,482 0,465 0,471 0,671 0,441 0,482 0,616 0,403 0,119 0,533 0,419 0,424 0,482
1997 0,529 0,506 0,518 0,750 0,503 0,524 0,635 0,409 0,157 0,612 0,457 0,419 0,544
ENFT 2
2000 0,517 0,476 0,509 0,771 0,466 0,532 0,667 0,440 0,091 0,682 0,428 0,381 0,522
2003 0,517 0,501 0,505 0,736 0,470 0,523 0,662 0,472 0,101 0,646 0,433 0,387 0,554
2004 0,512 0,511 0,491 0,774 0,460 0,508 0,657 0,424 0,113 0,626 0,424 0,457 0,534
Ecuador
ECV 
1994 0,653 0,677 0,595 0,843 0,711 0,521 0,731 0,501 0,157 0,739 0,485 0,738 0,640
1998 0,667 0,697 0,601 0,874 0,704 0,528 0,760 0,514 0,168 0,790 0,473 0,768 0,654
ENEMDU
2003 0,664 0,680 0,619 0,822 0,689 0,575 0,759 0,576 0,190 0,748 0,520 0,747 0,642
El Salvador
1991 0,548 0,581 0,497 0,666 0,602 0,436 0,592 0,335 0,096 0,566 0,447 0,562 0,588
2000 0,567 0,580 0,532 0,767 0,616 0,468 0,704 0,370 0,089 0,682 0,462 0,589 0,575
2002 0,590 0,614 0,552 0,802 0,623 0,495 0,741 0,397 0,108 0,710 0,476 0,611 0,616
2003 0,570 0,587 0,534 0,805 0,615 0,470 0,718 0,401 0,081 0,685 0,464 0,597 0,580
Guatemala
ENCOVI
2000 0,643 0,636 0,584 0,742 0,697 0,518 0,669 0,341 0,070 0,673 0,479 0,669 0,617
ENEI




Table 4.   Share of informal workers (productive definition) (continued).
Adults (25-64) Youths (15-24)
Age Gender Education Area Gender
Total (15-24) (25-64) (65 +) Female Male Low Medium High Rural Urban Female Male
Haiti 
2001 0,889 0,885 0,878 0,981 0,909 0,852 0,964 0,809 0,348 0,950 0,771 0,876 0,890
Honduras
1992 0,570 0,609 0,519 0,728 0,580 0,488 0,631 0,185 0,052 0,636 0,391 0,563 0,628
1997 0,601 0,627 0,553 0,723 0,620 0,514 0,650 0,297 0,072 0,676 0,436 0,568 0,654
1999 0,607 0,645 0,549 0,728 0,613 0,507 0,653 0,267 0,073 0,665 0,438 0,591 0,671
2003 0,638 0,688 0,584 0,734 0,645 0,548 0,690 0,325 0,056 0,722 0,459 0,616 0,718
Jamaica
1996 0,541 0,408 0,547 0,780 0,567 0,532 0,695 0,555 0,019 0,687 0,415 0,361 0,431
1999 0,562 0,505 0,548 0,826 0,527 0,565 0,673 0,573 0,080 0,666 0,442 0,393 0,569
2002 0,575 0,465 0,572 0,813 0,558 0,584 0,738 0,606 0,050 0,700 0,425 0,407 0,496
Mexico
1996 0,517 0,525 0,487 0,767 0,572 0,440 0,651 0,343 0,121 0,693 0,424 0,536 0,520
2000 0,496 0,488 0,471 0,788 0,533 0,437 0,654 0,385 0,084 0,718 0,405 0,476 0,495
2002 0,541 0,556 0,512 0,759 0,582 0,469 0,689 0,424 0,148 0,731 0,453 0,567 0,550
Nicaragua
1993 0,656 0,650 0,621 0,860 0,629 0,616 0,716 0,413 0,154 0,757 0,537 0,589 0,669
1998 0,657 0,664 0,614 0,828 0,678 0,575 0,711 0,434 0,153 0,708 0,552 0,700 0,651
2001 0,647 0,658 0,595 0,835 0,673 0,545 0,691 0,428 0,132 0,705 0,533 0,653 0,660
Panama
1995 0,448 0,543 0,398 0,804 0,359 0,418 0,623 0,316 0,077 0,622 0,279 0,546 0,541
1997 0,453 0,526 0,412 0,812 0,373 0,432 0,633 0,337 0,120 0,632 0,300 0,521 0,529
2001 0,486 0,597 0,439 0,833 0,395 0,463 0,669 0,363 0,102 0,697 0,314 0,566 0,610
2002 0,502 0,603 0,458 0,840 0,426 0,475 0,687 0,400 0,107 0,697 0,340 0,601 0,604
2003 0,502 0,612 0,456 0,827 0,436 0,468 0,692 0,398 0,124 0,694 0,341 0,600 0,617
Paraguay
1997 0,697 0,743 0,652 0,859 0,706 0,621 0,798 0,471 0,121 0,849 0,519 0,783 0,721
1999 0,686 0,734 0,642 0,858 0,727 0,591 0,798 0,444 0,107 0,830 0,506 0,772 0,714
2001 0,704 0,754 0,660 0,807 0,734 0,610 0,817 0,496 0,108 0,844 0,522 0,788 0,736
2002 0,737 0,799 0,684 0,872 0,743 0,648 0,827 0,531 0,105 0,854 0,561 0,810 0,793
2003 0,723 0,776 0,680 0,837 0,736 0,643 0,837 0,587 0,136 0,839 0,566 0,822 0,751
Peru
ENAHO 1
1997 0,649 0,721 0,606 0,797 0,718 0,519 0,836 0,567 0,114 0,821 0,503 0,764 0,688
1999 0,675 0,752 0,627 0,846 0,736 0,539 0,841 0,609 0,140 0,816 0,531 0,802 0,712
ENAHO 2
2001 0,676 0,736 0,640 0,812 0,738 0,563 0,834 0,636 0,141 0,824 0,544 0,798 0,689
2002 0,670 0,743 0,628 0,824 0,726 0,552 0,838 0,626 0,150 0,826 0,524 0,786 0,710
2003 0,695 0,772 0,650 0,854 0,740 0,576 0,842 0,654 0,149 0,845 0,544 0,829 0,729
Suriname
1999 0,250 0,290 0,238 0,667 0,267 0,214 0,412 0,274 0,173 0,238 0,276 0,300
Uruguay
1992 0,353 0,352 0,341 0,567 0,437 0,271 0,452 0,305 0,124 0,341 0,446 0,292
1995 0,356 0,353 0,343 0,593 0,420 0,287 0,461 0,321 0,105 0,343 0,428 0,303
1998 0,377 0,389 0,362 0,628 0,419 0,319 0,502 0,345 0,113 0,362 0,428 0,36434
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Table 4.   Share of informal workers (productive definition) (continued).
Adults (25-64) Youths (15-24)
Age Gender Education Area Gender
Total (15-24) (25-64) (65 +) Female Male Low Medium High Rural Urban Female Male
2000 0,387 0,415 0,371 0,585 0,418 0,336 0,513 0,356 0,110 0,371 0,445 0,395
2001 0,417 0,458 0,396 0,676 0,439 0,361 0,552 0,378 0,130 0,396 0,482 0,444
2002 0,428 0,488 0,409 0,632 0,441 0,384 0,573 0,402 0,129 0,409 0,491 0,486
2003 0,436 0,504 0,416 0,652 0,450 0,389 0,588 0,407 0,129 0,416 0,506 0,503
2004 0,424 0,485 0,402 0,638 0,440 0,372 0,565 0,408 0,132 0,402 0,493 0,480
Venezuela
1989 0,356 0,406 0,324 0,638 0,318 0,326 0,431 0,217 0,066 0,230 0,404 0,407
1995 0,453 0,509 0,423 0,722 0,396 0,436 0,562 0,342 0,081 0,317 0,452 0,530
1998 0,471 0,531 0,439 0,724 0,457 0,429 0,587 0,388 0,084 0,334 0,508 0,542
2000 0,505 0,578 0,473 0,705 0,484 0,467 0,619 0,439 0,105 0,350 0,566 0,583
2003 0,540 0,630 0,500 0,754 0,521 0,486 0,660 0,486 0,097 0,384 0,634 0,627
Informality
Share of adults in informal jobs
Definition 1: Informal = salaried workers in small firms, non-professional self-employed and zero-
income workers
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
Note: The division of salaried workers between large and small private firms is estimated in 
Colombia, El Salvador, 1991, and Haiti.
The conclusions are similar when restricting the analysis to urban 
areas. In fact, in most countries the performance of the rural areas in 
terms of labor informality changes was not worse than that of urban 
areas, while in some countries rural areas did better (e.g. Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua and Paraguay). 
The probability of being informal is decreasing in the worker’s educa-
tion (table 4). Instead, the profile for age has a U shape. 
Figure 4 shows relative employment and wages of the self-employed 
compared to the wage earners for the sample of those workers without 
a tertiary degree living in urban areas. The figures may be consistent 
with the idea of voluntary self-employment (Maloney, 2004). Unskilled 
young people enter the labor market as wage earners, accumulate 
knowledge, capital and contacts, and then set up their own informal 
businesses. 
Informality differs by sector of activity. In table 5 we divide the 




Figure 4.  Share of self-employed in employment by age. Wage ratio self-
employed/wage earners by age. Sample of unskilled workers 
from urban areas.
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).36
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share of informal workers10. Workers in primary activities are mostly 
informal (either unskilled self-employed, salaried workers in small 
farms, or family workers). On average, about half of the workers in 
the food and cloth industries in LAC are informal, most of them being 
self-employed. Informality is lower in the rest of the manufacturing 
industry: on average (LAC unweighted) around 40% of workers are 
either self-employed or wage earners in small firms (only a small frac-
tion declare themselves being family workers). Construction workers 
are mainly informal: around 60% are either self-employed or salaried 
workers in small establishments (in roughly the same proportion). 
Informality is even higher in the commerce sector (on average 65%). 
Differences across countries are considerable: while 56% of Bolivian 
workers in the commerce sector are unskilled self-employed, 50% of 
Panama’s workers in that sector are employed by large firms. Infor-
mality is substantially lower in the skilled-services sectors (banking, 
business services, professionals). On average, informality is around 
25%. Most workers in that sector are employees of large firms. In 
theory all public administration employees should be registered as 
public sector salaried workers, and hence be classified as formal. This 
occurs for the vast majority of workers, but there are exceptions that 
could be due to measurement errors, or situations where people work 
for the public administration through small private firms (e.g. con-
sulting jobs). In any case the registered informality rate in the public 
administration is around 1%. On average, around 30% of workers 
in the education and health sector are informal, being most of them 
unskilled-self employed. The relative low level of informality in the 
sector is mainly driven by the large share of the public sector in the 
provision of education and health. Finally, almost all domestic servants 
are informal. In most countries they are classified as salaried workers 
in small “firms” (houses). 
Informal workers are poorer than formal workers. This means that 
household income adjusted for demographic is lower for informal 
workers, not that they earn less than formal workers controlling for 
observable characteristics (next section has data on this). Table 6 pro-
vides details about the position of formal and informal workers (and 
of each of the labor categories) in the household income distribution 
10  To save space we show results for only seven countries. See Gasparini and Tornarolli (2006) 






























Food and clothes 46,4 5,0 45,5 0,8 2,3 18,1 25,4 2,9 100,0
Rest of industry 25,0 5,9 65,3 2,6 1,3 11,0 13,1 0,9 100,0
Construction 72,6 4,6 19,2 2,8 0,9 30,9 41,5 0,2 100,0
Commerce 62,0 7,3 28,1 0,4 2,2 25,8 32,0 4,1 100,0
Utilities & 
transportation
38,6 3,9 53,6 3,1 0,8 23,4 14,9 0,3 100,0
Skilled services 29,6 7,4 41,9 5,9 15,3 16,2 12,5 0,9 100,0
Public 
administration
0,5 0,0 4,7 94,8 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 100,0
Education and 
Health
20,1 2,9 32,6 38,3 6,1 10,4 9,4 0,3 100,0
Domestic servants 99,9 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 94,1 5,8 0,0 100,0
Total 44,6 4,6 31,5 15,7 3,5 24,2 18,9 1,5 100,0
Bolivia, 2002
Primary activities 91,3 4,9 3,4 0,2 0,2 4,0 32,6 54,6 100,0
Industry 68,4 5,0 24,9 1,0 0,7 14,6 40,5 13,3 100,0
Construction 60,4 4,4 25,7 9,2 0,3 24,9 34,2 1,4 100,0
Commerce 85,6 3,9 8,7 0,6 1,3 10,1 55,7 19,8 100,0
Utilities & 
transportation
66,1 5,0 24,9 3,5 0,6 26,4 38,0 1,8 100,0
Skilled services 35,3 9,1 39,0 2,8 13,8 18,9 14,8 1,6 100,0
Public
administration
3,0 0,0 2,8 91,0 3,2 2,5 0,5 0,0 100,0
Education and 
Health
27,8 2,5 19,1 48,3 2,3 7,8 18,0 2,1 100,0
Domestic servants 97,1 0,0 1,9 1,0 0,0 88,6 6,8 1,6 100,0
Total 77,0 4,4 10,9 6,8 1,0 11,8 35,1 30,1 100,0
Brazil, 2003
Primary activities 95,3 2,9 1,5 0,2 0,1 26,8 25,6 42,9 100,0
Food and clothes 38,7 3,9 56,4 0,4 0,6 8,1 26,9 3,7 100,0
Rest of industry 21,7 5,2 72,0 0,7 0,3 9,0 10,9 1,9 100,0
Construction 68,3 4,2 26,1 1,1 0,3 19,9 45,2 3,2 100,0
Commerce 55,2 8,2 35,5 0,3 0,9 18,3 30,2 6,7 100,0
Utilities & 
transportation
39,3 3,0 49,3 8,0 0,5 10,6 27,8 0,9 100,0
Skilled services 26,4 6,0 53,9 6,5 7,2 16,0 9,4 0,9 100,0
Public 
administration
0,5 0,0 1,9 97,6 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,2 100,0
Education and 
Health
23,4 3,0 30,7 40,5 2,4 8,3 13,4 1,7 100,0
Domestic servants 99,9 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 99,9 0,0 0,0 100,0
Total 55,0 4,2 28,6 11,1 1,1 22,4 21,1 11,4 100,038
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Primary activities 40,2 3,3 52,3 3,6 0,7 12,8 25,0 2,4 100,0
Food and clothes 32,0 3,8 62,7 0,2 1,3 7,9 22,7 1,4 100,0
Rest of industry 25,8 5,4 65,2 2,4 1,2 9,1 16,1 0,6 100,0
Construction 36,1 4,9 55,3 1,9 1,7 8,4 27,4 0,4 100,0
Commerce 47,7 6,0 44,0 0,4 1,9 12,0 31,1 4,6 100,0
Utilities & 
transportation
34,7 4,2 55,5 4,3 1,4 11,6 22,9 0,3 100,0
Skilled services 17,7 7,4 64,3 3,9 6,7 11,3 6,2 0,2 100,0
Public 
administration
0,1 0,0 1,2 98,7 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 100,0
Education and 
Health
13,4 2,6 43,1 38,4 2,6 6,2 7,0 0,2 100,0
Domestic servants 97,9 0,0 1,5 0,0 0,6 85,4 12,3 0,2 100,0
Total 37,0 4,1 45,9 11,2 1,8 15,8 19,6 1,6 100,0
Mexico, 2002
Primary activities 80,8 4,8 13,1 1,2 0,1 24,8 37,7 18,3 100,0
Food and clothes 39,2 3,4 55,9 1,3 0,2 15,9 17,7 5,7 100,0
Rest of industry 22,1 1,0 76,4 0,1 0,3 8,2 11,4 2,6 100,0
Construction 56,8 4,7 36,3 2,2 0,0 43,6 12,3 0,9 100,0
Commerce 67,5 4,6 26,6 0,5 0,8 21,6 32,3 13,5 100,0
Utilities & 
transportation
45,5 6,1 39,7 8,5 0,2 28,1 17,0 0,4 100,0
Public 
administration
0,6 0,0 1,6 97,8 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,3 100,0
Education and 
Health
7,4 1,9 18,6 70,4 1,7 4,0 1,8 1,7 100,0
Total 54,1 3,9 30,0 11,2 0,8 23,9 22,1 8,1 100,0
Nicaragua, 2001
Primary activities 76,9 7,0 15,9 0,1 0,1 17,5 26,8 32,7 100,0
Food and clothes 40,2 3,1 55,1 1,4 0,3 6,1 25,2 8,8 100,0
Rest of industry 47,0 13,6 37,9 1,5 0,0 22,5 18,1 6,4 100,0
Construction 46,6 7,8 42,3 3,4 0,0 28,6 15,9 2,1 100,0
Commerce 79,4 4,2 15,6 0,2 0,7 14,4 44,9 20,1 100,0
Utilities & 
transportation
53,6 4,2 28,9 13,1 0,2 27,6 23,7 2,3 100,0
Skilled services 30,8 6,5 48,6 8,4 5,6 16,4 11,8 2,7 100,0
Public 
administration
0,0 0,0 0,5 99,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 100,0
Education and 
Health
37,0 1,2 33,4 28,0 0,4 8,2 27,0 1,8 100,0
Domestic servants 96,1 0,0 3,9 0,0 0,0 93,0 2,4 0,8 100,0






























Primary activities 82,3 3,2 14,1 0,1 0,2 13,8 49,3 19,2 100,0
Food and clothes 43,0 1,6 55,3 0,0 0,2 5,4 35,9 1,7 100,0
Rest of industry 45,8 4,9 48,0 0,1 1,1 14,6 29,3 2,0 100,0
Construction 50,7 2,5 41,5 4,2 1,2 17,1 33,4 0,2 100,0
Commerce 43,3 5,7 50,2 0,0 0,8 13,2 26,8 3,4 100,0
Utilities & 
transportation
48,3 1,5 30,8 18,5 1,0 6,4 41,5 0,3 100,0
Skilled services 21,4 3,9 58,3 10,4 6,1 11,5 9,6 0,4 100,0
Public 
administration
0,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 100,0
Education and 
Health
29,2 1,1 19,8 49,1 0,8 4,9 23,8 0,5 100,0
Domestic servants 99,8 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 99,9 0,0 0,0 100,0
Total 49,7 2,9 30,2 16,3 0,9 15,4 29,2 5,2 100,0
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).



























Quintile 1 5,2 25,3 6,1 6,3 3,3 3,0 19,5 21,7 30,0 12,1
Quintile 2 11,2 24,0 8,9 12,6 10,4 4,1 22,3 22,8 25,6 16,3
Quintile 3 18,0 20,1 10,9 20,0 17,2 8,9 22,1 20,8 13,3 19,5
Quintile 4 25,6 17,9 19,7 25,9 27,5 18,4 21,6 18,7 20,5 23,3
Quintile 5 40,0 12,7 54,4 35,3 41,7 65,6 14,6 16,1 10,6 28,9
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Poor  3,1 16,6 4,6 3,6 1,8 2,1 12,7 13,4 22,5 7,6
Non-poor 96,9 83,4 95,4 96,4 98,2 97,9 87,4 86,7 77,5 92,4
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Bolivia, 2002
Quintile 1 4,7 30,0 18,8 1,4 1,6 2,6 2,5 22,2 49,4 23,9
Quintile 2 8,4 21,2 14,9 7,7 6,3 4,6 16,6 21,3 22,7 18,1
Quintile 3 17,1 17,8 12,9 20,8 15,7 2,8 24,5 20,0 12,6 17,6
Quintile 4 26,4 17,2 14,2 33,3 25,2 10,5 31,9 20,2 8,2 19,4
Quintile 5 43,4 13,9 39,2 36,8 51,3 79,5 24,4 16,3 7,1 21,0
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Poor  15,2 51,8 34,6 12,4 8,7 7,2 20,8 45,0 72,8 43,1
Non-poor 84,8 48,2 65,4 87,6 91,3 92,8 79,2 55,0 27,2 56,9
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,040
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Quintile 1 3,5 20,3 1,2 4,0 3,5 0,6 17,1 17,0 32,6 12,7
Quintile 2 11,2 22,5 4,0 13,2 9,8 1,0 25,0 19,2 23,9 17,4
Quintile 3 18,0 22,6 7,5 21,2 15,2 2,3 26,6 20,9 17,8 20,5
Quintile 4 27,8 21,3 17,5 30,9 25,7 7,9 21,7 23,8 15,7 24,2
Quintile 5 39,5 13,4 69,8 30,7 45,9 88,3 9,7 19,2 10,1 25,2
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Poor  3,7 19,8 1,3 4,3 3,4 0,6 16,7 16,7 31,7 12,6
Non-poor 96,3 80,2 98,8 95,7 96,6 99,4 83,3 83,3 68,3 87,5
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Chile, 2003
Quintile 1 8,9 13,8 0,6 10,8 5,2 0,3 19,2 9,9 10,9 10,6
Quintile 2 15,2 19,3 2,2 18,4 8,7 2,9 23,7 16,1 18,2 16,7
Quintile 3 19,8 22,3 5,3 22,1 18,0 5,2 24,8 20,8 16,8 20,7
Quintile 4 23,8 25,1 12,9 24,2 27,4 15,4 21,3 27,8 28,1 24,2
Quintile 5 32,4 19,5 79,0 24,5 40,7 76,2 11,0 25,5 26,0 27,8
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Poor  1,1 2,7 0,1 1,4 0,7 0,0 3,2 2,1 3,3 1,7
Non-poor 98,9 97,3 100,0 98,6 99,3 100,0 96,8 97,9 96,7 98,3
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Mexico, 2002
Quintile 1 5,6 25,0 34,2 2,7 1,9 29,8 13,0 32,1 41,9 16,0
Quintile 2 11,0 23,1 9,8 13,0 6,2 6,4 24,9 21,6 21,7 17,5
Quintile 3 17,9 20,0 10,6 21,5 11,5 9,2 23,2 18,3 14,9 19,0
Quintile 4 26,5 19,2 15,4 28,5 26,1 11,1 23,5 16,8 12,4 22,6
Quintile 5 39,0 12,7 30,1 34,3 54,3 43,5 15,4 11,2 9,1 24,9
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Poor  9,0 33,8 38,2 6,8 3,4 32,2 22,4 40,4 50,9 22,4
Non-poor 91,0 66,2 61,8 93,3 96,6 67,9 77,6 59,6 49,1 77,6
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Nicaragua, 2001
Quintile 1 5,0 19,2 6,2 5,7 2,2 0,0 12,1 18,3 28,4 14,2
Quintile 2 12,5 20,1 11,6 13,6 9,9 0,0 22,8 17,2 21,7 17,4
Quintile 3 19,3 20,8 15,7 21,4 15,8 2,5 22,2 19,8 20,8 20,3
Quintile 4 26,2 20,3 18,2 27,8 27,5 14,5 24,7 20,7 14,6 22,4
Quintile 5 37,1 19,7 48,4 31,6 44,6 83,0 18,3 23,9 14,5 25,8
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Poor  24,0 46,9 22,1 26,4 18,3 2,5 41,5 42,4 59,9 38,8
Non-poor 76,0 53,1 77,9 73,6 81,7 97,5 58,5 57,6 40,1 61,2




Table 6.   Informality by income quintile and poverty status. 



























Quintile 1 1,9 27,8 3,1 2,4 0,8 2,4 13,1 29,2 60,1 14,7
Quintile 2 9,6 22,0 8,2 12,4 5,1 4,5 25,3 21,4 16,9 15,8
Quintile 3 17,6 20,8 15,5 21,2 11,9 7,4 25,9 20,1 11,0 19,2
Quintile 4 28,7 17,7 20,8 30,5 27,4 14,9 23,9 16,9 5,5 23,2
Quintile 5 42,2 11,7 52,4 33,5 54,8 70,8 11,8 12,5 6,6 27,1
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Poor  1,3 21,9 1,2 1,6 0,6 1,4 8,4 23,4 53,8 11,6
Non-poor 98,7 78,1 98,8 98,4 99,4 98,6 91,6 76,6 46,2 88,4
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
of each country. On average, while 5% of formal workers belong to 
the poorest quintile of the household per capita income distribution, 
that share climbs to 22% for informal workers. In the other extreme, 
whereas more than 40% of formal workers are in the top quintile of 
the household income distribution, 15% of informal workers manage 
to get there. 
The last panel for each country in table 6 divides the formal and in-
formal working population into poor and non poor according to the 
international standard of USD 2 a day per person (at PPP). A worker 
is poor if her household per capita income is lower than USD 2 a day. 
In Argentina 2005, while 3.1% of formal workers are poor according 
to that measure, the proportion of the informal workers that are poor 
climbs to 16.6%. In all countries the difference in the poverty head-
count ratio between informal and formal workers is sizeable (around 
4 times on average). 
Although most entrepreneurs are not poor, in some countries a non-
negligible proportion of patrones is located in the low-income quintiles. 
Several measurement errors may cause this allocation. Surveys record 
current, not permanent income. Specifically, they report incomes in 
the month previous to the survey. Entrepreneurs’ incomes are usually 
volatile, and hence some of them may report low earnings in a given 42
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month11. The second measurement error was already mentioned. Some 
patrones may be just self-employed workers with low-productivity 
and hence low earnings. 
In Brazil while 30.7% of workers in large firms belong to the top 
quintile of the household income distribution, that proportion rises to 
45.9% for the public sector employees and to 88.3% for the skilled 
self-employed. That pattern is valid for nearly all LAC countries, al-
though with different intensities. A relatively robust ranking also holds 
for the three informal categories: the poverty headcount ratio for the 
zero-income workers is higher than for the self-employed, which in 
turn is higher than for salaried workers in small firms.
C. Informality II (“legalistic/social protection” definition)
As commented above, the Latin American household surveys have a 
weak coverage of labor and social protection issues. We could imple-
ment the social protection definition of labor informality in only 14 
countries of the sample. Moreover, several of them have questions 
only in some years, and the type of question differs across countries 
(see table 1). 
Table 7 displays the share of salaried workers without the right to 
receive pensions when retired. That informality rate is presented for 
several socioeconomic groups. Informality is relatively low in Chile 
and Uruguay (around 25%) and somewhat higher in Argentina, Bra-
zil and Venezuela (around 40%). The share of unprotected salaried 
workers is around 60% and higher in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru (see figure 5). As 
with the productive definition, labor informality in the social protection 
sense seems negatively correlated to per capita GDP and positively 
correlated to the share of rural population in the survey (figure 6). 
Again, when including both variables in a simple OLS regression, the 
latter becomes non-significant. 
11  The problem is not symmetric, since we expect most entrepreneurs to be non-poor when 




Figure 5.  Share of informal workers (social-protection definition). Salaried 
workers. Last available survey.
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
Figure 6.  Scatterplot informality (social-protection definition). – per capita 
GDP and share of rural population in household survey. Last 
available survey.
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).44
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Table 7.     Share of informal workers (social protection definition). 
Adults (25-64) Youths (15-24)
Total
Age Gender Education Area Gender
(15-24) (25-64) (65 +) Female Male Low Medium High Rural Urban Female Male
Argentina
EPH-15 cities
1992 0,312 0,507 0,241 0,548 0,290 0,210 0,347 0,211 0,111 0,241 0,504 0,509
1993 0,319 0,487 0,259 0,554 0,320 0,219 0,361 0,234 0,141 0,259 0,454 0,508
1994 0,291 0,475 0,231 0,404 0,282 0,198 0,339 0,209 0,098 0,231 0,436 0,499
1995 0,331 0,532 0,269 0,517 0,325 0,230 0,372 0,237 0,141 0,269 0,531 0,533
1996 0,351 0,530 0,295 0,624 0,343 0,264 0,440 0,253 0,154 0,295 0,546 0,519
1997 0,364 0,537 0,309 0,570 0,358 0,277 0,433 0,295 0,158 0,309 0,519 0,547
1998 0,371 0,562 0,311 0,582 0,353 0,281 0,465 0,269 0,168 0,311 0,553 0,568
EPH-28 cities
1998 0,379 0,590 0,315 0,573 0,359 0,284 0,469 0,272 0,169 0,315 0,590 0,591
1999 0,383 0,583 0,325 0,565 0,367 0,294 0,474 0,300 0,179 0,325 0,585 0,582
2000 0,385 0,598 0,331 0,446 0,383 0,292 0,478 0,318 0,176 0,331 0,581 0,609
2001 0,387 0,604 0,333 0,490 0,375 0,301 0,516 0,306 0,174 0,333 0,638 0,580
2003 0,388 0,656 0,330 0,531 0,340 0,323 0,503 0,332 0,184 0,330 0,656 0,656
EPH-C
2003-II  0,437 0,708 0,374 0,621 0,420 0,338 0,566 0,390 0,205 0,374 0,703 0,711
2004-I 0,433 0,676 0,371 0,594 0,408 0,343 0,540 0,388 0,212 0,371 0,698 0,663
2004-II 0,435 0,690 0,374 0,592 0,408 0,348 0,571 0,353 0,203 0,374 0,712 0,676
2005-I 0,430 0,657 0,376 0,535 0,429 0,336 0,551 0,359 0,221 0,376 0,659 0,655
Bolivia
Urban
2002 0,730 0,934 0,643 0,804 0,631 0,650 0,890 0,727 0,316 0,643 0,951 0,923
National
2000 0,663 0,907 0,561 0,779 0,537 0,574 0,835 0,589 0,313 0,629 0,552 0,905 0,909
2002 0,744 0,934 0,660 0,859 0,633 0,673 0,902 0,722 0,306 0,765 0,643 0,942 0,929
Brazil
1990 0,357 0,473 0,261 0,652 0,252 0,266 0,346 0,093 0,055 0,585 0,195 0,467 0,477
1992 0,378 0,511 0,290 0,627 0,312 0,275 0,372 0,129 0,080 0,586 0,245 0,523 0,504
1993 0,388 0,531 0,299 0,620 0,325 0,282 0,386 0,138 0,086 0,589 0,253 0,542 0,524
1995 0,383 0,516 0,302 0,633 0,331 0,283 0,390 0,152 0,088 0,554 0,266 0,525 0,510
1996 0,391 0,528 0,314 0,605 0,339 0,298 0,399 0,181 0,105 0,535 0,282 0,531 0,526
1997 0,380 0,518 0,307 0,598 0,328 0,293 0,401 0,161 0,095 0,547 0,272 0,520 0,516
1998 0,364 0,504 0,292 0,613 0,307 0,282 0,390 0,150 0,082 0,527 0,256 0,495 0,511
1999 0,367 0,504 0,300 0,561 0,317 0,288 0,404 0,161 0,074 0,512 0,267 0,494 0,512
2001 0,359 0,494 0,295 0,567 0,312 0,282 0,404 0,163 0,088 0,536 0,269 0,485 0,501
2002 0,361 0,507 0,296 0,591 0,312 0,283 0,409 0,172 0,085 0,533 0,271 0,504 0,510
2003 0,348 0,490 0,288 0,556 0,305 0,274 0,407 0,167 0,081 0,517 0,264 0,486 0,493
Chile
1990 0,214 0,353 0,174 0,268 0,214 0,154 0,279 0,135 0,061 0,319 0,149 0,364 0,347
1996 0,220 0,327 0,190 0,428 0,226 0,170 0,315 0,156 0,080 0,356 0,168 0,339 0,319
1998 0,229 0,350 0,198 0,475 0,237 0,175 0,339 0,172 0,074 0,367 0,178 0,343 0,354
2000 0,237 0,377 0,207 0,452 0,248 0,183 0,346 0,186 0,092 0,354 0,190 0,391 0,367




Table 7.     Share of informal workers (social protection definition) 
(continued).
Adults (25-64) Youths (15-24)
Total
Age Gender Education Area Gender
(15-24) (25-64) (65 +) Female Male Low Medium High Rural Urban Female Male
Colombia
1996 0,611 0,765 0,542 0,816 0,471 0,586 0,783 0,461 0,215 0,773 0,439 0,703 0,804
1999 0,587 0,777 0,516 0,753 0,445 0,563 0,789 0,452 0,173 0,749 0,408 0,722 0,814
Ecuador
ECV 
1994 0,614 0,823 0,502 0,429 0,437 0,532 0,702 0,469 0,262 0,738 0,439 0,755 0,856
1998 0,607 0,822 0,491 0,566 0,439 0,517 0,745 0,439 0,234 0,664 0,448 0,754 0,849
El Salvador
1991 0,602 0,744 0,512 0,752 0,424 0,549 0,713 0,263 0,113 0,813 0,340 0,654 0,780
2000 0,470 0,613 0,391 0,811 0,252 0,464 0,649 0,238 0,107 0,693 0,289 0,441 0,685
2002 0,454 0,603 0,386 0,711 0,240 0,465 0,666 0,250 0,112 0,657 0,293 0,406 0,689
2003 0,482 0,618 0,414 0,778 0,279 0,485 0,692 0,285 0,085 0,686 0,316 0,440 0,700
Guatemala
ENCOVI
2000 0,656 0,717 0,586 0,806 0,591 0,583 0,694 0,351 0,277 0,716 0,481 0,685 0,733
ENEI
2002 0,599 0,667 0,535 0,666 0,495 0,550 0,648 0,298 0,350 0,673 0,428 0,665 0,669
Mexico
2000 0,550 0,664 0,494 0,887 0,436 0,520 0,696 0,387 0,254 0,809 0,439 0,614 0,691
2002 0,590 0,699 0,539 0,743 0,518 0,551 0,745 0,445 0,275 0,812 0,488 0,628 0,737
Nicaragua
1993 0,623 0,749 0,553 0,817 0,506 0,580 0,688 0,321 0,155 0,767 0,468 0,684 0,781
1998 0,715 0,859 0,619 0,981 0,573 0,646 0,760 0,402 0,273 0,784 0,533 0,837 0,867
2001 0,682 0,782 0,613 0,936 0,537 0,655 0,760 0,403 0,282 0,789 0,548 0,683 0,824
Paraguay
1997 0,753 0,869 0,676 0,780 0,646 0,692 0,832 0,551 0,372 0,790 0,635 0,882 0,861
1999 0,738 0,885 0,662 0,643 0,655 0,666 0,833 0,566 0,328 0,806 0,616 0,893 0,880
2001 0,726 0,898 0,625 0,714 0,594 0,644 0,826 0,538 0,255 0,775 0,570 0,897 0,898
2002 0,738 0,892 0,652 0,688 0,624 0,668 0,845 0,575 0,253 0,745 0,625 0,888 0,894
2003 0,744 0,899 0,664 0,667 0,634 0,683 0,866 0,627 0,321 0,756 0,633 0,925 0,881
Peru
ENAHO 1
1999 0,772 0,925 0,686 0,993 0,657 0,703 0,928 0,730 0,460 0,870 0,656 0,935 0,917
ENAHO 2
2001 0,732 0,921 0,649 0,729 0,648 0,649 0,896 0,687 0,399 0,853 0,609 0,911 0,927
2002 0,719 0,915 0,638 0,778 0,638 0,638 0,878 0,698 0,413 0,787 0,613 0,931 0,904
2003 0,702 0,915 0,618 0,552 0,650 0,598 0,868 0,694 0,347 0,809 0,590 0,916 0,914
Uruguay
2001 0,232 0,417 0,183 0,429 0,226 0,145 0,295 0,148 0,056 0,183 0,420 0,416
2002 0,237 0,440 0,193 0,419 0,238 0,153 0,324 0,156 0,053 0,193 0,436 0,443
2003 0,258 0,490 0,213 0,437 0,252 0,177 0,357 0,177 0,054 0,213 0,488 0,492
2004 0,276 0,528 0,223 0,437 0,263 0,188 0,376 0,185 0,070 0,223 0,532 0,52646
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Table 7.    Share of informal workers (social protection definition)
(continued).
Adults (25-64) Youths (15-24)
Total
Age Gender Education Area Gender
(15-24) (25-64) (65 +) Female Male Low Medium High Rural Urban Female Male
Venezuela
1995 0,338 0,521 0,267 0,424 0,219 0,297 0,401 0,177 0,099 0,118 0,449 0,551
1998 0,354 0,553 0,279 0,416 0,240 0,302 0,414 0,204 0,128 0,175 0,490 0,582
2000 0,319 0,509 0,254 0,328 0,216 0,279 0,375 0,199 0,105 0,112 0,417 0,551
2003 0,416 0,650 0,342 0,438 0,302 0,370 0,510 0,291 0,137 0,221 0,622 0,664
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
The likelihood of having the right to pensions when retired is decreas-
ing in education and has a U-shaped pattern with respect to age. The 
youth and the elderly are less covered by the social security system 
linked to employment than the adult population. While in some coun-
tries women are more likely to be informal than men, that situation is 
not generalized in the region. In contrast, labor informality is always 
higher in rural areas than in the cities. 
We cannot provide a complete picture of what has happened with the 
social protection dimension of labor informality over the last decade 
in LAC with household survey data, since there are few countries with 
enough observations. Labor informality has increased in Argentina, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela, has remained roughly unchanged in Chile 
and Paraguay, and has slightly decreased in Brazil and Peru (figure 
7). Probably the main conclusion from the evidence is that there are 
no signs of a pattern toward less labor informality in the region. Most 
results hold when restricting the analysis to urban areas. 
Social protection is low among salaried domestic servants, construction 
workers and rural workers (table 8). Informality is in general lower 
in the manufacturing industry, the skilled services, and in particular 
in the education, health and public administration sectors. However, 
notice that while in principle we expect all public sector workers to 
be covered by basic social protection, on average 20% of them report 




Figure 7.  Share of informal workers (social protection definition).
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
Table 8.   Informality by sector (legalistic definition).















2004 2002 2003 2003 2003 2002 2002 2001 2003 2002 2004 2003
Primary 
activities
37,6 89,2 66,8 30,0 95,5 69,6 93,4 92,9 94,6 88,3 45,7 68,7
Industry low 
tech
50,4 79,7 25,2 17,3 28,8 46,1 44,5 48,1 79,2 74,4 28,7 36,0
Industry high 
tech
28,1 18,7 17,8 45,5 57,8 21,8 66,8 79,6 74,4 27,3 34,9
Construction 76,8 96,5 54,7 23,9 74,2 80,8 83,5 83,4 95,9 85,4 40,2 64,2
Commerce 53,5 88,9 34,2 21,4 54,7 63,7 59,7 67,5 85,6 79,1 33,0 49,0
Utilities & 
transportation
45,9 87,4 22,2 20,8 60,6 60,7 60,5 56,5 60,1 74,9 15,0 46,5
Skilled 
services
36,8 74,3 19,0 14,5 22,0 26,9 70,5 36,3 69,9 54,9 19,7 24,5
Public admi-
nistration
10,0 31,9 15,1 9,9 7,1 36,1 43,7 27,2 27,1 48,5 1,5 8,2
Education 
and Health
21,5 37,6 18,8 14,1 25,0 40,8 27,8 40,8 41,7 49,2 13,3 33,2
Domestic 
servants
95,4 99,4 70,6 50,7 98,0 97,8 97,6 98,3 72,8 74,6
Total 43,6 74,4 34,8 22,5 48,2 59,9 59,0 68,3 74,4 71,9 27,6 43,9
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).48
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Household income for the formal employees is substantially higher 
than for informal salaried workers (table 9). The poverty headcount 
ratio for the USD-2-a-day line is on average 6 times higher for the 
latter group. 
The presence of a formal contract is a key feature of a labor relation-
ship. Signing a contract makes the relationship more visible, and then 
increases the likelihood for the compliance with the labor legislation. 
Unfortunately, only few surveys include questions on labor contracts. 
Table 10 reports the share of salaried workers having signed a contract. 
That share is above 75% in Chile, above 50% on Mexico and Panama, 
and below 45% in the rest of the countries in the sample. As with pen-
sions, signed contracts are more common among prime-age adults, the 
skilled and urban workers. From the scarce information of the table 
there are no signs of a fall in informality. In fact, the share of salaried 
workers with contracts has fallen in Chile and Mexico, the only two 
countries for which data goes back to the early 1990s. 
D.   Comparing the two definitions 
To what extent the two definitions of labor informality overlap? In 
table 11 we compute the share of workers without the right to pen-
sions when retired (i.e. our definition of social-protection informal-
ity) by labor category (i.e. the basis for our definition of productive 
informality). An initial observation is that a sizeable share of workers 
classified as formal by the productive definition are informal in the 
social-protection sense. Even in the public sector, pensions seem not 
to be a universal right. In 10 out of the 14 countries in the sample the 
share of uncovered public sector workers is above 10%. That share 
climbs for the other two formal labor categories. In particular, the 
share of uncovered self-employed professionals is high (around 90% 
in many countries). As it will be shown in the next section this group 
enjoys the highest earnings of all groups. The typical Latin American 
self-employed professional has high relative earnings, but (s)he is 
out of the social security system. The share of large-firms employees 
without right to pensions is also high on average, although with large 
variations across countries: while around 20% of those workers are 
uncovered in the Southern Cone, the share goes up to more than 60% 
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Table 10.   Labor contracts. Salaried workers.
Adults (25-64)
Total
Age Gender Education Area
(15-24) (25-64) (65 +) Female Male Low Medium High Rural Urban
Bolivia
2002 0,394 0,191 0,467 0,250 0,556 0,427 0,226 0,404 0,793 0,354 0,485
Chile
1990 0,828 0,736 0,854 0,735 0,840 0,862 0,772 0,884 0,946 0,725 0,877
1994 0,795 0,702 0,821 0,649 0,784 0,840 0,711 0,849 0,944 0,713 0,835
1996 0,775 0,671 0,801 0,630 0,773 0,818 0,670 0,833 0,924 0,645 0,822
1998 0,763 0,657 0,789 0,558 0,752 0,812 0,642 0,815 0,922 0,625 0,809
2000 0,764 0,646 0,788 0,604 0,755 0,809 0,648 0,805 0,915 0,653 0,805
2003 0,774 0,664 0,796 0,657 0,766 0,816 0,672 0,808 0,900 0,674 0,810
Dominican Rep. 
2003 0,431 0,347 0,458 0,368 0,454 0,461 0,371 0,454 0,573 0,391 0,482
2004 0,411 0,326 0,438 0,383 0,452 0,429 0,368 0,436 0,528 0,394 0,453
Ecuador
2003 0,367 0,220 0,432 0,256 0,532 0,384 0,185 0,523 0,853 0,206 0,560
El Salvador
2000 0,283 0,222 0,314 0,103 0,394 0,272 0,173 0,384 0,491 0,140 0,373
2002 0,252 0,213 0,271 0,116 0,339 0,233 0,129 0,334 0,418 0,147 0,313
2003 0,259 0,217 0,279 0,070 0,344 0,246 0,158 0,338 0,420 0,143 0,329
Guatemala
ENCOVI
2000 0,372 0,269 0,436 0,260 0,492 0,414 0,289 0,589 0,775 0,316 0,493
ENEI
2002 0,331 0,266 0,374 0,205 0,439 0,350 0,232 0,619 0,724 0,232 0,485
Mexico
1992 0,553 0,462 0,598 0,416 0,667 0,573 0,407 0,787 0,921 0,224 0,671
1996 0,526 0,408 0,579 0,324 0,629 0,556 0,357 0,717 0,898 0,252 0,643
2000 0,512 0,404 0,559 0,226 0,649 0,518 0,312 0,671 0,887 0,232 0,615
2002 0,533 0,419 0,578 0,411 0,617 0,557 0,336 0,689 0,888 0,262 0,637
Nicaragua
1998 0,255 0,178 0,300 0,068 0,313 0,292 0,203 0,414 0,613 0,166 0,369
Panama
2001 0,570 0,626 0,560 0,375 0,514 0,591 0,561 0,598 0,505 0,473 0,584
2002 0,542 0,556 0,544 0,203 0,478 0,589 0,508 0,578 0,536 0,446 0,571
2003 0,541 0,535 0,547 0,234 0,480 0,595 0,504 0,588 0,536 0,427 0,580
Suriname
1999 0,874 0,787 0,888 0,924 0,859 0,767 0,859 0,937 0,888
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
The great majority of informal workers in the productive sense are 
also informal in the legalistic sense. The mapping is not perfect, par-
ticularly for the salaried workers in small firms. In some countries a 




20% in Argentina and Venezuela, 30% in Brazil and Uruguay and 
50% in Chile). 
Table 12 classifies workers in each country according to the two defi-
nitions of informality. The last column records the share of workers 
which are consistently classified as formal or informal by the two 
definitions. On average, more than 75% are in that group. That share is 
higher when considering all workers (instead of just salaried workers).12 
There are few workers who are informal in the productive sense but 
have access to social security (column (iii)). The relatively large social 
security systems in the Southern Cone account for most of these cases. 
Instead, there are more formal workers in the productive sense which 
are informal in the legalistic sense: the low social-security coverage of 
the self-employed professionals, and to a lesser extent the employees 
of large firms are behind the figures in column (ii). 
12   Presumably, the share would be even higher if we increased the cut-off point for firm size 
to define formality in the productive sense.










Unskilled Large firms Public sector
Argentina 2004 29,9 10,8 82,1
Bolivia 2002 75,9 32,1 86,5 97,3 98,8
Brazil 2003 18,4 11,8 46,1 67,2 87,2
Chile 2003 16,2 8,8 61,8 50,1 83,2
Colombia  1999 14,0 73,7 95,7
Ecuador 1998 60,1 8,8 91,6
El Salvador 2003 35,5 7,0 88,4 93,6 98,5
Guatemala 2002 42,0 22,2 95,7 93,9 99,7
Mexico 2002 44,2 31,0 90,7
Nicaragua 2001 59,3 22,2 90,6 94,1 99,3
Paraguay 2003 74,2 19,0 90,9 95,8 99,0
Peru 2002 65,8 40,4 89,4 96,2 98,0
Uruguay 2004 19,5 1,4 32,8 68,0 82,6
Venezuela 2003 33,3 14,0 81,8
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).52
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Table 12.  Share of workers without right to pensions by labor category. 
Sample













Argentina 2004 Only salaried workers 50,6 15,6 6,1 27,8 100,0 78,4
Bolivia 2002 Only salaried workers 24,6 35,5 1,1 38,9 100,0 63,5
All workers 7,6 15,5 0,8 76,1 100,0 83,7
Brazil 2003 Only salaried workers 53,3 10,6 11,8 24,2 100,0 77,6
All workers 36,2 8,8 10,2 44,8 100,0 81,0
Chile 2003 Only salaried workers 67,0 11,6 10,7 10,8 100,0 77,7
All workers 51,8 11,4 11,2 25,6 100,0 77,4
Colombia  1999 Only salaried workers 86,0 14,0 100,0 86,0
All workers 13,6 10,6 2,8 73,0 100,0 86,6
Ecuador 1998 Only salaried workers 36,9 32,4 2,6 28,1 100,0 65,0
El Salvador 2003 Only salaried workers 49,9 20,8 1,9 27,4 100,0 77,3
All workers 28,8 16,2 1,5 53,4 100,0 82,2
Guatemala 2002 Only salaried workers 37,8 24,1 2,3 35,7 100,0 73,5
All workers 15,4 15,1 1,0 68,5 100,0 83,9
Mexico 2002 Only salaried workers 37,6 25,7 3,4 33,2 100,0 70,9
Nicaragua 2001 Only salaried workers 29,5 30,7 2,3 37,5 100,0 67,0
All workers 14,9 20,4 1,5 63,3 100,0 78,1
Paraguay 2003 Only salaried workers 23,6 27,4 2,1 47,0 100,0 70,6
All workers 10,5 17,1 1,4 71,0 100,0 81,5
Peru 2002 Only salaried workers 26,6 36,1 1,4 35,9 100,0 62,5
All workers 11,4 21,6 1,4 65,5 100,0 77,0
Uruguay 2004 Only salaried workers 64,1 9,9 8,3 17,7 100,0 81,8
All workers 49,3 8,4 10,0 32,3 100,0 81,6
Venezuela 2003 Only salaried workers 53,4 19,2 5,0 22,4 100,0 75,9
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
Note:   (In)formal P= (in)formal in the productive sense (definition 1).
  (In)formal L= (in)formal in the legalistic sense (definition 2).
III.   Wages and hours of work 
In this section we document relative wages and hours of work of dif-
ferent labor categories. We start by showing unconditional statistics 
and then turn to a multivariate regression analysis. 
Table 13 shows relative hourly wages by type of work. In the first 
panel the base group is wage earners, while in the second panel wages 
of public sector employees are set at 100. In our companion paper we 
also show statistics for hours of work. On average for the region, en-




hour 2.5 times more. Compared to the wage earners, the self-employed 
work 10% fewer hours and earn 10% less per hour. However, this aver-
age hides a variety of situations across countries. In Chile and some 
Central American countries, for instance, hourly wages are higher for 
the group of self-employed. 
The second panel breaks down the working population into more 
labor categories. In general, the ranking of hourly wages is leaded 
by the self-employed professionals followed by the entrepreneurs, 
the salaried workers in the public sector, the salaried workers in large 
firms, the unskilled self-employed, and the salaried workers in small 
firms. On average, the skilled self-employed earn around 60% more 
than public sector employees. Large firm’s employees earn 30% less 
than in the public sector. That percentage climbs to 50% for the case 
of the unskilled self-employed and to 60% for the wage earners in 
small firms. 
Hours of work do not differ much across groups. Entrepreneurs and 
large-firms employees work in general more hours than in the public 
sector, while hours of work are approximately the same for the rest 
of the groups. The exception is the group of zero income workers for 
whom hours of work are 20% lower than in the public sector. 
To further analyze wage differentials across groups we run regressions 
of the log of hourly wages against several controls and dummies for 
informal workers. The conditional measures of the earnings gap of 
being informal arising from these regressions should be interpreted 
with much care13. In particular, welfare comparisons drawn from these 
results may be misleading. An informal job differs from a formal one 
in many dimensions, not only in the hourly wage paid. If we find that 
hourly wages are the same in both sectors, the informal job may still 
be inferior since it precludes the access to social protection14, but it 
could be also superior, at least for some workers, since informality 
usually implies more flexibility: “being your own boss” is certainly a 
work amenity for many people. 
13  See Maloney (2004). 
14  Under the legalistic view, that is true by definition. Under the productive view social protec-
tion is not precluded for informal workers but it is rarer. 54
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Table 13.   Relative wages by type of work. 
Formal workers Informal workers
























1992 100 124 100 100 231 76 97
1993 100 117 93 100 200 66 89
1994 100 116 86 100 189 59 77
1995 226 100 109 185 87 100 197 61 74
1996 224 100 114 175 82 100 197 59 71
1997 200 100 112 154 79 100 201 58 68
1998 215 100 115 162 81 100 231 51 63
EPH - 28 cities
1998 218 100 110 164 81 100 224 51 62
1999 200 100 105 149 80 100 196 51 63
2000 184 100 102 139 82 100 165 50 65
2001 202 100 95 155 83 100 170 53 60
2003 212 100 100 158 80 100 164 49 60
EPH-C
2003-II  212 100 98 157 81 100 152 48 61
2004-I 172 100 94 128 86 100 139 47 60
2004-II 173 100 97 132 87 100 145 49 61
2005-I 197 100 99 142 79 100 133 49 59
Bolivia
Urban
1993 252 100 87 162 75 100 171 31 49
1997 245 100 82 176 86 100 168 33 54
2002 176 100 80 114 73 100 139 36 47
National
1997 247 100 73 180 87 100 175 38 51
2000 144 100 46 108 89 100 99 38 34
2002 121 100 64 79 73 100 143 38 39
Brazil
1990 340 100 97 199 65 100 313 22 50
1992 217 100 92 133 72 100 202 28 53
1993 329 100 99 199 72 100 283 25 53
1995 370 100 105 222 70 100 303 27 54
1996 397 100 111 240 70 100 293 29 58
1997 360 100 105 212 68 100 296 27 52
1998 348 100 98 215 72 100 268 29 52
1999 334 100 96 196 68 100 255 28 48
2001 334 100 96 194 66 100 236 28 47
2002 324 100 96 186 65 100 247 28 46




Table 13.   Relative wages by type of work (continued).
Formal workers Informal workers






















1990 692 100 164 498 79 100 297 41 106
1994 806 100 151 555 78 100 268 41 92
1996 586 100 165 414 76 100 377 40 98
1998 617 100 185 536 99 100 421 51 136
2000 581 100 151 427 79 100 274 42 95
2003 591 100 165 401 71 100 319 38 92
Colombia
ENH-Urban
1992 271 100 104 179 100 172 57
2000 237 100 84 123 100 135 33
ENH-National
1996 238 100 82 135 100 169 41
1999 186 100 64 98 100 118 29
2000 223 100 76 132 100 177 38
ECH-Urban
2000 229 100 66 124 100 122 29
2004 168 100 64 93 100 111 28
ECH-National
2004 166 100 58 84 100 113 25
Costa Rica 
1992 144 100 93 92 60 100 169 41 58
1997 169 100 109 101 58 100 138 37 64
2000 178 100 107 114 61 100 162 46 67
2001 191 100 101 120 61 100 187 41 62
2003 171 100 102 104 59 100 168 38 61
Dominican Rep. 
ENFT 1
1996 338 100 135 340 113 100 370 68 126
1997 223 100 103 170 79 100 170 49 76
ENFT 2
2000 363 100 115 290 83 100 234 52 85
2003 307 100 107 237 79 100 216 48 76
2004 264 100 107 216 88 100 205 49 83
Ecuador
ECV 
1994 200 100 104 137 73 100 208 54
1998 263 100 85 145 60 100 123 33
ENEMDU
2003 202 100 106 116 58 100 245 40
El Salvador
1991 189 100 94 117 64 100 244 48
2000 272 100 83 141 51 100 104 2956
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Table 13.   Relative wages by type of work (continued).
Formal workers Informal workers





















2002 238 100 84 129 58 100 107 31
2003 293 100 83 167 54 100 103 45
Guatemala
ENCOVI
2000 190 100 90 91 54 100 196 29
ENEI
2002 197 100 70 107 62 100 142 33
Haiti 
2001 61 100 36 31 100 118
Honduras
1992 197 100 71 115 61 100 354 28
1997 343 100 128 206 65 100 183 37
1999 264 100 118 147 59 100 159 34
2003 185 100 100 87 52 100 133 27
Jamaica
1990 853 100 46
1996 250 100 63 133 51 100 34
1999 95 100 89 66 76 100 46
2002 168 100 139 117 78 100 46
Mexico
1992
1996 251 100 83 147 60 100 142 32
2000 331 100 75 205 67 100 145 34
2002 174 100 61 106 65 100 154 38
Nicaragua
1993 181 100 135 157 93 100 243 73
1998 287 100 96
2001 322 100 105 202 69 100 185 43
Panama
1995 238 100 82 176 79 100 240 31
1997 207 100 73 157 82 100 31
2001 180 100 63 118 63 100 133 30
2002 248 100 64 161 65 100 113 30
2003 191 100 61 122 62 100 131 29
Paraguay
1997 267 100 90 150 65 100 259 35
1999 248 100 77 146 68 100 185 36
2001 283 100 62 150 59 100 121 32
2002 303 100 68 179 66 100 108 38
2003 293 100 80 171 70 100 126 35
Peru
ENAHO 1
1997 180 100 68 180 111 100 122 86




Table 13.   Relative wages by type of work (continued).
Formal workers Informal workers






















2001 190 100 77 149 92 100 145 53
2002 162 100 68 144 117 100 143 51
2003 212 100 72 145 76 100 99 44
Suriname
1999 214 100 90 193 93 100 54
Uruguay
1989 217 100 101 194 99 100 107 56
1992 306 100 113 273 96 100 285 53
1995 220 100 109 185 89 100 252 49
1998 263 100 104 211 85 100 206 50
2000 245 100 106 191 82 100 217 48
2001 248 100 97 191 81 100 211 49
2002 254 100 93 202 86 100 214 48
2003 259 100 92 201 82 100 188 48
2004 298 100 98 209 71 100 194 40
Venezuela
1989 200 100 92 159 81 100 185 42
1995 216 100 106 185 95 100 236 51
1998 210 100 105 170 85 100 176 49
2000 159 100 100 124 80 100 144 53
2003 154 100 90 108 72 100 123 44
First panel: wage earners=100
Second panel= public sector employees=100
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
There is a second reason why regressions should be interpreted with 
care. The informality coefficients may be biased if unobserved worker 
characteristics that affect productivity influence the sector an individual 
chooses to work. It could be that only people with entrepreneurial abil-
ity choose to be self-employed, and then become successful. Or on 
the other hand, it could be that people with low work attachment and 
without ability to tolerate authority, responsibilities and punctuality 
choose to be self-employed, and then probably get low earnings, in 
part precisely because the lack of these characteristics. 
Table 14 shows the results of estimating log hourly wage regressions 
using Heckman maximum likelihood for a sample of urban workers 
aged 15 to 70. We exclude skilled workers (i.e. with a tertiary degree) 
and the group of patrones from the analysis, and run the regressions 58
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for men and women separately. In addition to the usual set of controls 
(education, age, regional dummies) we include interactions between 
education and informality. In particular, we construct interaction vari-
ables by multiplying the informal binary variable with two educational 
dummies: one for those without any secondary education, and one for 
those with some high-school education. We also include interactions 
with dummies variables for the youth (15-24) and the elderly (56-
70). Table 14 is divided into three panels according to the definition 
of informality. Panel A considers the productive definition. Since as 
said above we exclude skilled workers and employers, the regressions 
report the wage gaps between the (i) unskilled-self employed + small-
firms salaried workers, and (ii) salaried workers in large firms and the 
public sector. In panel B we compare unskilled self-employed with 
unskilled salaried workers. Finally, in panel C we restrict the analysis 
to unskilled salaried workers and divide them according to the social 
protection definition of informality. In each panel the table shows the 
coefficients of the interaction variables. 
Table 14.   Hourly wage regressions. 
A. Informal 1 (productive)
Country Year
Males Females
Primary Secondary Young  Old Primary Secondary Young  Old
Argentina 2004 -0.352*** -0,254 -0,018 0,017 -0,194 -0,348 -0,066 -0,165
Bolivia 2002 -0.229*** -0,086 -0,032 0,056 -0,047 -0,157 -0,057 -0,216
Brazil 2003 -0.269*** -0.210*** 0.080*** -0.098*** -0.214*** -0.292*** -0,025 -0.088***
Chile 2003 0.332*** 0.308*** 0,121 0,024 0.081*** 0,035 -0,091 -0.124**
Costa Rica  2003 -0,044 -0.205*** -0,019 -0,161 -0.232*** -0.131** 0,147 0,119
Ecuador 2003 -0.152*** -0.159*** 0,055 -0,040 -0.222*** -0.208*** 0,062 -0,070
El Salvador 2003 -0,053 -0,089 0,024 0,011 -0,082 -0.427*** -0,006 -0.181*
Guatemala 2002 -0.157** -0.179* -0,099 -0.380** -0.282*** -0.318** 0,210 -0.358**
Haiti  2001 -1.603*** -0.991*** 0,180 -0,088 -1.008*** -1.634*** 0,359 0,107
Honduras 2003 -0.311*** -0.260*** 0.370*** 0,137 -0.307*** -0.575*** 0,181 -0,106
Jamaica 2002 -0,244 -0,089 -0,106 -0.736** -0,269 -0.362*** -0,089 0,197
Mexico 2002 -0.219*** -0.255*** 0.185** -0.177** -0.100* -0.411*** 0,180 -0,102
Nicaragua 2001 -0,091 -0,168 0,118 -0.308* -0.226** -0,041 0.420** 0,194
Panama 2003 -0.288*** -0.316*** 0,015 -0,114 -0.577*** -0.478*** -0,163 -0,133
Paraguay 2003 -0.522*** -0.422*** 0,112 -0,133 -0.603*** -0.601*** -0,042 -0,120
Peru 2002 -0.196*** -0.203*** -0,049 -0.199* -0,066 -0.134** -0,038 -0,013
Suriname  1999 -0.306* 0,047 0,371 -0,682 0,284 -0,124 -0.659* -1.202*
Uruguay  2004 -0.401*** -0.271*** 0,030 -0.120*** -0.206*** -0.348*** -0,019 -0.145***







Primary Secondary Young  Old Primary Secondary Young  Old
Argentina 2004 -0.251*** -0,079 -0,252 0,063 -0,572 -0,353 0,281 -0,110
Bolivia 2002 -0.241*** 0,023 -0,111 -0,033 -0,041 0,038 0,097 -0,128
Brazil 2003 -0.064*** -0.056*** 0.108*** -0.050* -0.070*** -0.049** 0,018 -0.175***
Chile 2003 0.582*** 0.560*** 0,098 -0,019 0.493*** 0.467*** -0.342*** -0,032
Costa Rica  2003 0,070 -0.158** -0,047 -0.355*** 0,122 0.151* 0,384 0,041
Ecuador 2003 -0,050 -0,038 -0,025 -0,010 0,001 0,014 0,055 0,003
El Salvador 2003 0,060 0,053 0,180 0,013 0.094** -0.285*** 0,037 -0.217**
Guatemala 2002 -0,041 -0,154 -0,146 -0.462** -0,011 -0,189 0,126 -0,238
Haiti  2001 -0,233 -0.393* 0,165 -0,112 -0.412** -1.449*** 0,366 0,161
Honduras 2003 -0.211*** -0.219** 0.437*** 0,198 -0,012 -0.394*** 0,131 -0,100
Jamaica 2002 0,890 0,354 -1.075** -0.708*** -0.622** 0.451***
Mexico 2002 -0.110* -0.175*** 0,250 -0.237* -0.232*** -0.348*** 0,315 -0,075
Nicaragua 2001 0,105 -0,024 -0,064 -0,266 0,055 0,070 0,190 0,190
Panama 2003 -0.199*** -0.254*** -0,031 -0,102 -0.268*** -0.168** -0,148 0,096
Paraguay 2003 -0.457*** -0.295*** 0,126 -0,101 -0.463*** -0.395*** 0,046 -0,110
Peru 2002 -0,098 -0.117** 0,160 -0.274*** -0,083 -0,091 0,084 0,014
Suriname  1999 -0.360* 0,201 0,702 -0,661 0,217 -0.751*** -0.733** -0,561
Uruguay  2004 -0.313*** -0.159*** -0,015 -0,073 -0.294*** -0.257*** -0,198 -0,064
Venezuela 2003 -0.109** -0,027 0,041 -0,119 -0.237*** -0.338*** -0,276 -0.236**
C. Informal 2 (social protection)
Country Year
Males Females
Primary Secondary Young  Old Primary Secondary Young  Old
Argentina 2004 -0.469*** -0.487*** 0,012 -0,031 -0.177*** -0,434 -0,084 -0.124***
Bolivia 2002 -0,051 -0.286*** 0,104 -0,111 -0,315 -0.669*** -0,166 -0,120
Brazil 2003 -0.391*** -0.353*** 0.110*** -0.086*** -0.278*** -0.359*** -0.034** -0,04
Chile 2003 -0.234*** -0.256*** 0.137*** 0.080** -0.120*** -0.164*** 0,015 -0.114***
El Salvador 2003 -0.173*** -0.231*** 0,065 -0,071 -0.241*** -0.412*** 0.131** 0,082
Guatemala 2002 -0.138** -0.248*** -0.184*** 0,039 -0.480*** -0.376*** 0,105 0,326
Mexico 2002 -0.300*** -0.329*** 0.092*** 0,031 -0.277*** -0.420*** 0.106*** -0.196***
Nicaragua 2001 -0.234*** -0.300*** 0.181** -0.304** -0.265*** -0.337*** 0,133 -0,030
Paraguay 2003 -0.533*** -0.475*** 0,080 -0,075 -0.452*** -0.477*** -0,067 -0,127
Peru 2002 -0.326*** -0.230*** -0,044 0,030 -0.233** -0.366*** 0,068 0,031
Uruguay  2004 -0.406*** -0.453*** 0.217*** -0.197*** -0.142*** -0.328*** 0.135*** -0.214***
Venezuela 2003 -0.075** -0,063 -0.156*** -0,111 -0.232*** -0.135** 0,011 0,089
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
In most countries being informal in the productive sense implies lower 
wages, even when controlling for observable factors. On average, 
informal male workers without a secondary education earn 30% less 
than their formal counterparts. The wage gap for those with second-
ary education is also significant, although somewhat smaller in most 
countries. Wage gaps of roughly the same magnitude are also present 60
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in the case of female workers. The coefficients of the interaction vari-
ables with age groups are mostly non-significant. In some few countries 
being informal is associated to higher wages for the youth and lower 
wages for the elderly. 
Panel B indicates that while in half of the countries in the sample 
being an unskilled self-employed implies lower wages than being an 
unskilled salaried worker, in the other half there are no significant 
differences in wages. In panel C the results are more conclusive: in 
nearly all countries salaried workers with social protection also earn 
substantially more than informal salaried workers. That seems to be 
true for males and females and for both educational groups. 
IV.   Informality over the cycle 
In this section we take a look at the behavior of informality over the 
business cycle. Do informal employment and relative wages across sec-
tors move pro or anti-cyclically with the economy? It has been argued 
that the co-movements of these variables over the cycle can provide 
some preliminary evidence over the relevance of the dualistic view of 
informality.15 According to this hypothesis when the economy enters a 
recession, sticky wages in formal firms force them to fire workers, who 
find in the informal sector a way to survive waiting for better times. 
The informal sector serves as disguised unemployment by absorbing 
displaced workers during downturns. The flow of entrants into the 
“flex-wage” informal sector drives wages down relative to the formal 
sector which remains downwardly rigid. Hence, relative (informal/
formal) sector size and wages should move oppositely. 
In contrast, under other assumptions and shocks, the two variables 
may go in the same direction. For instance, if informality is perceived 
as a close substitute for a formal job, an autonomous increase of the 
informal sector relative wage (e.g. after an autonomous increase in 
the relative price of non-tradables) should attract workers and hence 
increase the size of that sector. 




We do not have enough data to carry out a rigorous test of the co-move-
ments between the size of the informal sector, relative wages and the 
cycle.16 Instead, we present a preliminary analysis of these variables for 
the countries in the sample. Table 15 shows the ratio informal/formal for 
the number of workers and median hourly wages.17 As in the previous 
section, these ratios are shown for men and women separately, and for 
three alternative definitions of informality: (i) self-employed+salaried 
workers in small firms, (ii) self-employed, and (iii) salaried workers 
without right to pensions. In each country we also show an index 
of real per capita GDP based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP). 
Table 15.   Ratio informal/formal in number of workers and wages.
  Unskilled urban workers
Informal = self-employed + 
salaried 
workers in small firms
Informal = self - employed
Informal = salaried 
workers without right to 
pensions
Percapita Males Females  Males Females  Males Females
GDP I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf
Argentina
1992 100 0,39 0,75 0,52 0,85
1993 105 0,40 0,80 0,55 0,77
1994 110 0,37 0,71 0,46 0,74
1995 105 0,92 0,80 1,53 0,83 0,53 0,86 0,59 0,83 0,43 0,65 0,59 0,74
1996 109 1,00 0,84 1,60 0,91 0,50 0,86 0,58 0,99 0,47 0,73 0,64 0,72
1997 117 0,93 0,84 1,55 0,88 0,45 0,87 0,62 0,88 0,51 0,65 0,65 0,67
1998 120 0,94 0,80 1,52 0,90 0,47 0,87 0,60 0,91 0,53 0,64 0,66 0,63
1999 114 0,98 0,79 1,61 0,86 0,50 0,87 0,60 0,90 0,55 0,65 0,70 0,64
2000 112 1,06 0,77 1,68 0,86 0,56 0,87 0,62 0,92 0,55 0,60 0,72 0,57
2001 106 1,09 0,78 1,67 0,77 0,59 0,88 0,68 0,73 0,54 0,61 0,71 0,61
2003 100 1,28 0,77 1,68 0,84 0,74 0,84 0,67 0,92 0,59 0,58 0,64 0,56
Bolivia
1993 100 1,66 0,88 7,70 0,56 0,80 1,04 3,91 0,71
1997 109 1,85 0,88 7,84 0,69 1,11 0,98 4,88 0,87
2000 110 1,98 0,88 6,19 0,72 1,27 0,85 4,15 0,69 1,83 0,52 1,84 0,34
2002 110 2,13 0,84 6,77 0,77 1,20 0,83 4,21 0,77 2,59 0,45 2,61 0,30
Brazil
1992 100 0,91 0,62 1,55 0,59 0,48 0,83 0,48 0,78 0,41 0,44 0,55 0,44
1993 103 0,93 0,66 1,57 0,58 0,49 0,88 0,48 0,83 0,42 0,42 0,58 0,44
1995 110 1,00 0,71 1,68 0,67 0,53 0,94 0,54 1,00 0,44 0,47 0,58 0,45
1996 118 1,03 0,73 1,58 0,69 0,54 0,98 0,48 1,04 0,48 0,51 0,61 0,50
16  Using multivariate co-integration techniques Fiess et al. (2002) find periods of co move-
ments of relative earnings and sector size in Mexico and Brazil.
17  The analysis is carried out for the sample of urban workers aged 15 to 70 without tertiary 
education who are not in the patrones group.62
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Table 15.   Ratio informal/formal in number of workers and wages.
  Unskilled urban workers (continued).
Informal = self-employed + 
salaried 
workers in small firms
Informal = self - employed
Informal = salaried 




Males Females  Males Females  Males Females
GDP I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf
1997 120 1,03 0,68 1,64 0,65 0,55 0,92 0,50 0,94 0,46 0,49 0,57 0,50
1998 119 1,05 0,70 1,57 0,65 0,57 0,90 0,49 0,90 0,43 0,48 0,51 0,47
1999 118 1,09 0,70 1,67 0,66 0,60 0,88 0,51 0,88 0,45 0,48 0,53 0,47
2001 121 1,03 0,69 1,64 0,67 0,55 0,86 0,50 0,83 0,44 0,49 0,53 0,51
2002 122 1,03 0,68 1,64 0,69 0,55 0,85 0,51 0,83 0,45 0,51 0,54 0,50
2003 120 1,04 0,71 1,68 0,70 0,55 0,85 0,52 0,80 0,43 0,52 0,51 0,57
Chile
1990 100 0,66 1,16 1,49 0,81 0,44 1,47 0,53 1,37 0,17 0,65 0,31 0,67
1994 128 0,63 1,08 1,35 0,79 0,42 1,40 0,50 1,22 0,13 0,65 0,22 0,63
1996 148 0,59 1,25 1,23 0,88 0,38 1,73 0,45 1,60 0,20 0,60 0,31 0,67
1998 158 0,60 1,30 1,31 0,90 0,38 1,78 0,45 1,57 0,21 0,63 0,33 0,66
2000 160 0,56 1,19 1,27 0,90 0,38 1,57 0,47 1,37 0,23 0,58 0,35 0,62
2003 168 0,59 1,39 1,28 0,99 0,41 1,86 0,47 1,58 0,21 0,70 0,35 0,67
Costa Rica 
1992 100 0,51 0,91 0,88 0,78 0,31 0,95 0,35 0,96
1997 109 0,69 0,83 1,17 0,77 0,37 0,99 0,51 0,96
2000 122 0,75 0,91 1,23 0,76 0,43 1,08 0,45 0,86
2001 121 0,74 0,87 1,27 0,79 0,42 1,03 0,59 0,89
2003 127 0,66 0,84 1,36 0,77 0,35 0,96 0,64 0,99
Dominican 
Rep.
1996 100 1,08 1,22 1,30 0,77 0,76 1,42 0,64 1,31
1997 106 1,11 1,03 1,26 0,75 0,84 1,14 0,68 1,06
2000 127 1,11 1,26 1,25 0,96 0,88 1,40 0,64 1,20
2003 131 1,24 1,16 1,30 0,90 1,04 1,27 0,68 1,26
2004 128 1,18 1,27 1,37 0,90 0,95 1,40 0,66 1,25
El Salvador
1991 100 0,95 0,73 2,08 0,65 0,38 0,82 1,43 0,65 0,79 0,53 0,54 0,47
2000 119 0,89 0,75 1,86 0,75 0,40 0,88 1,12 0,79 0,70 0,51 0,34 0,50
2002 119 0,97 0,79 1,88 0,75 0,44 0,94 1,13 0,78 0,72 0,53 0,33 0,52
2003 118 0,94 0,85 1,83 0,87 0,41 1,00 1,03 0,94 0,76 0,56 0,37 0,55
Honduras
1992 100 0,73 0,69 1,30 0,34 0,38 0,83 0,63 0,51
1997 103 0,98 0,91 1,48 0,70 0,46 1,11 0,85 0,81
1999 98 1,00 0,84 1,50 0,75 0,46 1,05 0,84 0,88
2003 102 1,22 0,67 1,88 0,61 0,62 0,77 1,15 0,68
Mexico
1996 98 0,89 0,70 1,40 0,59 0,37 0,84 0,61 0,59
2000 115 0,92 0,72 1,20 0,56 0,33 0,89 0,53 0,54 1,01 0,56 0,84 0,50




Table 15.   Ratio informal/formal in number of workers and wages.
  Unskilled urban workers (continued).
Informal = self-employed + 
salaried 
workers in small firms
Informal = self - employed
Informal = salaried 




Males Females  Males Females  Males Females
GDP I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf
Panama
1995 100 0,57 0,80 0,88 0,41 0,42 0,87 0,25 0,73
1997 110 0,59 0,78 0,98 0,43 0,42 0,78 0,36 0,64
2001 122 0,69 0,77 1,01 0,53 0,50 0,77 0,35 0,73
2002 122 0,78 0,75 1,25 0,53 0,53 0,75 0,49 0,72
2003 125 0,80 0,80 1,22 0,53 0,56 0,86 0,47 0,67
Paraguay
1997 100 1,44 0,77 3,87 0,63 0,76 0,84 1,80 0,63 2,43 0,59 2,63 0,44
1999 95 1,16 0,72 4,04 0,63 0,58 0,74 1,89 0,63 2,02 0,64 2,46 0,47
2001 93 1,48 0,69 4,38 0,55 0,74 0,70 2,05 0,49 2,01 0,53 2,18 0,42
2002 89 1,78 0,60 4,42 0,46 0,93 0,53 2,20 0,40 2,37 0,53 2,56 0,38
2003 88 2,04 0,62 7,64 0,49 1,10 0,60 3,51 0,41 2,33 0,50 2,59 0,40
Peru
1997 100 1,63 0,92 4,78 0,81 0,88 0,90 2,87 0,74
1999 97 1,95 0,78 6,28 0,73 1,10 0,78 3,43 0,67 2,74 0,62 2,82 0,46
2001 97 1,88 0,78 5,60 0,73 1,02 0,74 3,13 0,68 2,11 0,60 2,42 0,49
2002 100 1,79 0,79 5,36 0,81 0,97 0,81 2,86 0,76 2,09 0,57 2,46 0,51
2003 102 1,99 0,78 6,78 0,77 1,10 0,78 3,57 0,74 1,78 0,56 2,51 0,48
Uruguay
1989 100 0,55 0,73 1,32 0,57 0,35 0,79 0,52 0,55
1992 110 0,48 0,76 1,16 0,68 0,34 0,82 0,45 0,73
1995 117 0,53 0,82 1,22 0,70 0,37 0,89 0,47 0,73
1998 132 0,64 0,76 1,23 0,73 0,42 0,82 0,41 0,76
2000 125 0,68 0,73 1,26 0,75 0,46 0,80 0,43 0,73
2001 120 0,80 0,72 1,33 0,75 0,51 0,79 0,47 0,68 0,25 0,50 0,36 0,56
2002 107 0,89 0,66 1,41 0,73 0,58 0,69 0,49 0,64 0,26 0,49 0,36 0,53
2003 109 0,92 0,64 1,46 0,71 0,59 0,67 0,51 0,58 0,30 0,44 0,40 0,52
2004 119 0,84 0,65 1,45 0,66 0,55 0,70 0,54 0,61 0,33 0,50 0,44 0,51
Venezuela
1995 100 0,75 1,03 0,55 0,75 0,63 1,10 0,36 0,83 0,14 0,90 0,17 0,60
1998 100 0,81 1,17 0,85 0,79 0,67 1,25 0,62 0,81 0,29 0,80 0,26 0,67
2000 94 0,87 1,12 1,00 0,91 0,68 1,21 0,75 0,89 0,17 0,75 0,13 0,83
2003 78 1,01 0,85 1,28 0,74 0,68 0,92 0,85 0,73 0,40 0,77 0,27 0,74
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
Some cases are consistent with the dualistic view of informality, while 
some others fit better into the voluntary view of informality. In Argen-
tina, and according to the prediction of the labor-market-segmentation 
hypothesis, the share of informal workers greatly raised during the 64
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crisis that started around 1998. There is also some fall in the relative 
wage of informal workers, although that result does not hold when 
considering only the self-employed as informal. In Chile, the relative 
number of informal workers went down during the expansion 1990-
1998, while relative wages for that sector increased. From 1998 to 
2003 changes have been erratic. 
The case of Brazil seems more consistent with the voluntary view of 
informality. During the economic expansion in the first half of the 
1990s both the relative size and wages of the informal sector grew. 
When the economy came to a halt in the late 1990s the share of work-
ers in informal jobs remained roughly constant, along with relative 
wages. 
Most LAC countries have experienced an economic expansion in the 
early and mid 1990s, followed by stagnation and even recessions in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s18. Table 16 summarizes the direction 
of the changes in relative size and wages between urban unskilled 
self-employed and their formal salaried counterparts. The patterns 
are similar across countries during recessions: the relative size of the 
informal sector increases, while relative wages fall. There are few 
exceptions to this behavior. Instead, during expansions the patterns 
have been different. Some few countries experienced similar changes 
as those commented above for Chile. That is the case of Mexico. The 
rest, instead, has shared the experience of Brazil with higher informal-
ity, although in half of the countries the increase in the informal sector 
size was not accompanied by a raise in relative wages. 
Summarizing, during the recent recessions informality has increased 
along with a fall in relative wages, in accordance with the dualistic 
view of the labor market. However, the symmetric story for the eco-
nomic expansions did not take place in most LAC countries. In several 
economies informality increased during periods of strong GDP growth. 
That fact may respond to a voluntary view of the labor market: in 
good times people take advantage of the larger set of opportunities 
and decide to be self-employed. Of course, the evidence of increasing 
informality both in expansions and downturns is also consistent with 




some structural changes that induced an increase in self-employment 
and that operated regardless of the economic cycle. 
Table 16.  Direction of changes in the ratio informal/formal in number of 
workers and wages.
Expansion Stagnation/contraction
I/F Wi/Wf I/F Wi/Wf
Argentina ↓ = ↑  ↓
Bolivia  ↑ ↓  ↑ ↓
Brazil  ↑  ↑ = ↓
Chile ↓  ↑
Costa Rica   ↑  ↑ ↓ ↓
El Salvador  ↑  ↑ =  ↑
Honduras  ↑ =
Mexico ↓  ↑  ↑ =
Panama  ↑ ↓
Paraguay  ↑ ↓
Peru  ↑ ↓
Uruguay  ↑ =  ↑ ↓
Venezuela  ↑ ↓
Informal = self-employed
Unskilled urban workers
V.  Changes in employment and informality 
A given surge in the level of informality in an economy could be the 
consequence of either an increase in the propensity to informality 
within groups, or to a change in the structure of employment toward 
groups with high propensity to informal arrangements. In this section 
we examine this issue for the case of salaried workers and the social 
protection definition of informality. 
Informality varies across groups. As discussed above, the access to 
social protection linked to the job is not uniform across age, gender 
and education groups. The heterogeneity is significant also across 
economic sectors, type of firms and jobs. Due to the need for more 
labor flexibility, high monitoring costs for the government, and other 
reasons some sectors have high propensity to informality. Construction 
workers and domestic servants are more likely to be informal than pub-
lic sector employees. Also, part-timer workers, small-firm employees 66
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and newly-recruited staff tend to have, ceteris paribus, lower access 
to social protection in their jobs. If for some reason the structure of 
employment changes toward one of these groups, the average rate of 
informality in the economy will probably increase. On the other hand, 
the propensity to informality may increase within each group, making 
the overall rate to grow.
We carry out a decomposition in order to assess the extent to which 
observed changes in the overall rate of informality in a country are 
the consequence of changes in the structure of employment or in the 
propensity to informality within groups. To that aim we follow the 
microeconometric decomposition methodology of Gasparini (2002). 
The main inputs are the estimated coefficients of models for the in-
formality status of a worker. The actual change in the informality rate 
between time t1 and t2 in a country is the consequence of changes in 
the characteristics of the population (the matrix of the independent 
variables in the regression) and changes in the estimated coefficients 
of the informality regression. We label these effects as characteristics 
and parameters effects. 
Table 17 shows changes in the structure of employment of urban sala-
ried workers, while table 18 documents changes in the share of infor-
mal workers (social protection definition) by group. The main results 
of the informality regressions are presented in table 19. We estimate 
probit models for the informality variable (social protection definition) 
for the sample of urban salaried workers. As regressors we include 
gender, age, age squared, educational dummies, equivalent household 
income, categorical variables for the type of firm, seniority, a dummy 
for part-time worker, and dummies for regions and economic sectors. 
All regressions are similar across countries, except for the definitions 
of the regional dummies. 
Table 17.   Structure of employment. Urban salaried workers
Argentina Brazil Chile El Salvador Paraguay Uruguay  Venezuela
1995 2003 2004 1993 2003 1990 2003 1991 2003 1997 2003 2001 2004 1995 2003
Gender
Female 40,5 45,4 42,3 41,0 44,9 37,1 40,5 40,2 41,9 40,4 43,1 46,1 46,1 43,6 43,9




Table 17.   Structure of employment. Urban salaried workers (continued).
Argentina Brazil Chile El Salvador Paraguay Uruguay  Venezuela
1995 2003 2004 1993 2003 1990 2003 1991 2003 1997 2003 2001 2004 1995 2003
Age
0-24 21,6 16,6 17,4 29,8 25,9 20,3 14,7 27,5 24,2 35,1 30,7 17,9 15,4 21,9 18,4
25-40 43,3 43,6 44,0 45,9 45,1 51,3 47,4 48,0 51,2 43,2 42,5 39,4 39,0 51,0 48,0
41-55 27,3 29,8 27,9 19,9 24,2 22,6 30,0 18,9 20,2 18,0 21,7 31,8 34,0 22,7 26,8
56-65 7,1 8,7 9,4 3,9 4,2 5,3 7,1 4,5 3,7 3,0 4,5 9,7 10,1 3,8 6,1
66 + 0,8 1,3 1,3 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,8 1,1 0,6 0,7 0,7 1,3 1,5 0,5 0,8
Education (years)
Low (0-8) 39,6 25,9 29,8 65,8 48,9 30,0 19,4 46,7 33,7 47,8 39,2 37,5 34,7 36,4 33,8
Middle 
(9-13)
39,3 40,0 41,2 24,6 39,1 49,0 54,3 37,1 44,9 36,9 38,5 43,3 43,3 40,8 36,4




0,7 1,1 1,1 6,2 5,0 8,9 8,6 7,9 3,4 2,3 1,8 3,7 4,3 0,8 0,7
Industry 1 8,2 7,1 7,3 8,5 7,0 10,2 5,9 13,2 14,9 8,5 6,4 8,6 7,8 9,9 6,4
Industry 2 12,3 8,2 8,7 11,5 9,9 10,9 8,6 9,0 7,2 6,4 6,0 5,4 5,6 8,6 7,3
Construc-
tion
4,5 2,8 5,7 6,3 5,1 7,8 8,3 7,0 8,3 6,3 5,1 5,3 4,5 3,5 5,0




9,7 9,4 9,1 7,2 5,9 8,3 8,7 7,6 6,7 8,4 8,2 8,0 7,6 6,6 7,3
Skilled 
services
9,4 10,7 8,9 5,0 9,2 5,9 8,3 4,4 7,5 6,5 6,2 8,1 7,5 17,7 11,6
Public ad-
ministration
9,9 9,9 9,6 8,6 8,6 4,4 5,6 11,0 8,7 8,1 9,9 11,3 12,2 7,9 9,0
Education 
& Health
20,7 26,3 20,4 15,6 17,1 17,5 18,6 15,6 16,3 13,6 16,5 19,4 21,8 24,2 25,9
Domestic 
servants
7,8 7,4 9,4 14,1 12,3 9,5 9,2 8,7 6,4 16,1 18,4 12,2 12,1 2,8 5,4
Type of firm
Large 49,1 45,2 46,0 48,3 49,3 61,3 63,3 47,3 54,5 41,3 34,5 50,4 48,9 60,9 56,9
Small 28,8 31,0 32,8 29,8 32,0 22,8 20,3 26,3 27,7 39,6 44,2 26,1 25,9 10,4 18,9
Public 22,0 23,8 21,2 21,8 18,7 16,0 16,4 26,3 17,8 19,0 21,3 23,4 25,2 28,7 24,2
Seniority (years)
Less than 1 29,3 27,5 28,1 27,7 41,4 34,1
1 to 5 35,3 32,2 38,9 39,8 34,1 32,7
5 to 10  14,5 16,8 16,3 15,1 12,7 17,8
10 + 20,9 23,4 16,7 17,4 11,8 15,4
Hours of work
1-25 17,5 23,1 21,8 8,2 10,0 5,1 9,4 7,2 6,6 10,1 12,6 16,0 16,5 1,7 4,8
26-45 47,9 42,7 43,5 56,9 56,9 20,8 32,1 46,4 46,8 37,5 35,7 43,3 45,2 75,3 65,6
45+ 34,6 34,2 34,7 34,9 33,1 74,1 58,4 46,4 46,6 52,4 51,7 40,7 38,3 23,0 29,6
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).68
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The results of the decomposition exercises are shown in table 20. 
Given data availability we carried out the microsimulations only for 
seven countries. The results can be read as follows. Labor informality 
increased 6 points among urban salaried workers in Argentina between 
1995 and 2003. If only the parameters linking observable character-
istics to informality (i.e. the estimated coefficients in the first two 
columns of table 19) had changed in that period, and all observable 
characteristics had remained fixed, informality would have increased 
by 7 points. On the other hand if only the observable characteristics 
of workers (including those of their jobs) had changed, informality 
would have fallen 1 percentual point. In fact, although the employ-
ment structure changed in some informality-increasing directions as 
the fall in the share of large firms, and the sizeable growth in part-time 
jobs, other changes were informality-decreasing, as the raise in the 
share of education, health and skilled services in total employment, 
and the reduction in the share of workers with low seniority (see table 
17). On average, these changes between 1992 and 2003 were slightly 
informality-decreasing19. The large growth in informality seems to have 
been associated to a sizeable increase in the propensity to informality 
in most groups (the parameters effect) (see table 18). A similar story 
applies to the rest of the Southern Cone countries: Chile, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. In Brazil the characteristics effects was similar to that of 
their neighbors, but the parameters effect was smaller, averaging out 
a negligible change in overall informality. In contrast, Venezuela has 
large values of both effects, leading to a large increase in informality. 
El Salvador is the only country in the sample with a significant fall in 
informality driven entirely by a change in the employment structure 
in favor of prime-age adults, the skilled, and those employed in large 
firms. 
19  Notice that when using the EPH Continua 2004 some results change. In particular, the 
characteristic effect becomes positive. Unfortunately it is difficult to trace the causes of 
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Table 20.   Decompositions of changes in informality (social protection 









1995-2003 0,06 -0,01 0,07
1995-2004 0,11 0,03 0,08
Brazil
1993-2003 0,00 -0,01 0,01
Chile
1990-2003 0,02 -0,02 0,04
El Salvador
1991-2003 -0,05 -0,09 0,04
Paraguay
1997-2003 0,01 -0,03 0,04
Uruguay
2001-2004 0,04 -0,01 0,05
Venezuela
1995-2003 0,14 0,06 0,09
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
IV. Characterizing differences in informality across    
countries 
Recorded informality rates considerably vary across countries. Dif-
ferences are in part due to noise in the information, since household 
surveys are not uniform in the region. But there are genuine differences 
rooted in the variety of productive and employment structures across 
the region. One of the main relevant differences is the rural-urban mix 
of the population. In more rural countries informality is expected to be 
higher. Table 21 shows rates for national, urban and rural areas. The 
standard deviation for the urban observations is 2 points lower than 
for the national observations. 
But even ignoring rural areas differences in informality across coun-
tries remain large (see figure 8). In this section we characterize these 
differences using microsimulation techniques similar to those applied 
in section V (also based in Gasparini, 2002). In particular, we com-
pare the actual informality rate in a country A to the counterfactual 




characteristics of some other country B. That exercise implies keep-
ing the parameters that govern the relationship between observable 
characteristics and informality fixed at the country A’s values. 
Figure 8.  Informality rate (productive definition). National and urban 
areas.
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
Table 21.   Informality rate. National, rural and urban areas.
Productive definition  Social protection definition 
National Rural Urban National Rural Urban
Argentina 0,413 0,376
Bolivia 0,708 0,863 0,613 0,660 0,765 0,643
Brazil 0,522 0,859 0,456 0,288 0,517 0,264
Chile 0,364 0,540 0,341 0,198 0,327 0,183
Colombia 0,584 0,714 0,548 0,516 0,749 0,408
Costa Rica  0,390 0,475 0,341
Dominican Rep.  0,491 0,626 0,424
Ecuador 0,619 0,748 0,520 0,491 0,664 0,448
El Salvador 0,534 0,685 0,464 0,414 0,686 0,316
Guatemala 0,625 0,735 0,484 0,535 0,673 0,428
Honduras 0,584 0,722 0,459
Jamaica 0,572 0,700 0,425
Mexico 0,512 0,731 0,453 0,539 0,812 0,488
Nicaragua 0,595 0,705 0,533 0,613 0,789 0,548
Panama 0,456 0,694 0,341
Paraguay 0,680 0,839 0,566 0,664 0,756 0,633
Peru 0,650 0,845 0,544 0,618 0,809 0,590
Suriname 0,238
Uruguay 0,402 0,223
Venezuela 0,500 0,384 0,342 0,221
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).74
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Country A may have a higher informality rate, measured as lack of 
social protection, than country B due to a different employment struc-
ture, even when within each group informality is the same as in the 
other economy. For instance, country A may have a larger construction 
sector or a larger fraction of its labor force as part-time workers. But 
it could also be the case that for each particular group for some reason 
informality is higher in A. For instance, it could be that construction 
is carried out mainly by big urban development firms in country B 
which tend to be more formal, and that the government in B has more 
effective instruments to audit labor regulation for part-time workers. 
The decompositions allow us to have an idea of the relative magnitude 
of these two channels. Of course this is not a general equilibrium ex-
ercise. When we import the characteristics of country B into country 
A the parameters would probably change. A larger part-time labor 
force may induce the government to increase the efforts to auditing 
the compliance with labor regulations (or to give up, given the size of 
the task…). In this sense, the microsimulations are partial-equilibrium 
exercises that illustrate the size of the direct channels through which 
each change operates. 
The results of the decompositions can be used to assess scenarios un-
der which a country may reduce informality. A larger characteristics 
effect implies that by transforming the employment structure country 
A may reduce informality to the country B’s level. That may require 
progress in education, demographic transitions or sectoral changes in 
production, all phenomena related to economic development. Instead, 
a large parameters effect suggests that for some reason informality is 
larger in A for each group (or most groups), and that may be more 
related to specific policy issues, as high tax pressure, low auditing 
efforts, or insufficient legislation. 
The decompositions are carried out for both definitions of informality. 
In the social protection case we restrict the analysis to urban salaried 
adult workers, while in the productive definition the sample includes 
urban adult workers. The regressions that estimate the parameters of 
the informality models are similar to the ones explained in section V 
and shown in table 19. 
The results of the decompositions are shown in table 22 for the produc-




definition. The first panel in table 22 shows that if Argentina imported 
the parameters of Chile, informality would fall from 44% to 35%, that 
is, a parameter effect of -9 points (see third panel). If Argentina kept 
its parameters but took the observable employment characteristics of 
Nicaragua, informality would increase from 44% to 53%, i.e. a char-
acteristic effect of +9 points (see second panel). 
Table 22.   Decomposition of informality rates. Productive definition.
Simulated rates
Parameters of country…
Arg Bra Chi Cos Dom Els Gua Jam Hon Mex Nic Pan Par Per Uru Ven
Characteristics of 
Arg 0,44 0,37 0,35 0,33 0,40 0,33 0,38 0,38 0,35 0,40 0,44 0,38 0,47 0,51 0,39 0,41
Bra 0,50 0,47 0,39 0,42 0,49 0,43 0,49 0,41 0,47 0,49 0,53 0,46 0,59 0,60 0,49 0,48
Chi 0,44 0,41 0,34 0,34 0,42 0,34 0,39 0,43 0,36 0,42 0,43 0,38 0,49 0,51 0,40 0,43
Cos 0,47 0,39 0,36 0,35 0,43 0,38 0,41 0,34 0,38 0,43 0,48 0,39 0,55 0,58 0,42 0,44
Dom 0,47 0,41 0,37 0,38 0,44 0,41 0,45 0,39 0,43 0,45 0,49 0,42 0,55 0,57 0,43 0,44
Els 0,49 0,42 0,38 0,39 0,43 0,43 0,47 0,37 0,45 0,47 0,51 0,41 0,58 0,60 0,46 0,44
Gua 0,51 0,46 0,38 0,41 0,45 0,45 0,50 0,40 0,48 0,50 0,53 0,44 0,61 0,63 0,47 0,47
Jam 0,43 0,38 0,31 0,32 0,40 0,32 0,34 0,41 0,32 0,38 0,41 0,36 0,45 0,49 0,38 0,41
Hon 0,52 0,47 0,40 0,42 0,47 0,46 0,50 0,40 0,49 0,50 0,54 0,46 0,63 0,64 0,48 0,49
Mex 0,49 0,43 0,39 0,39 0,45 0,44 0,46 0,40 0,45 0,47 0,52 0,44 0,57 0,60 0,46 0,47
Nic 0,53 0,51 0,41 0,44 0,51 0,48 0,53 0,44 0,52 0,53 0,56 0,48 0,63 0,64 0,50 0,51
Pan 0,44 0,37 0,34 0,33 0,42 0,34 0,37 0,38 0,34 0,40 0,44 0,38 0,48 0,52 0,38 0,42
Par 0,50 0,45 0,41 0,40 0,47 0,40 0,47 0,39 0,45 0,49 0,53 0,44 0,56 0,58 0,46 0,47
Per 0,44 0,42 0,33 0,34 0,42 0,37 0,41 0,43 0,38 0,43 0,46 0,37 0,51 0,54 0,40 0,43
Uru 0,46 0,41 0,37 0,37 0,44 0,37 0,42 0,39 0,39 0,43 0,48 0,42 0,52 0,53 0,41 0,44
Ven 0,45 0,39 0,36 0,38 0,43 0,39 0,44 0,39 0,42 0,44 0,48 0,40 0,52 0,54 0,43 0,41
Characteristics effect
                             Characteristics of country…
Arg 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,05 0,07 -0,01 0,08 0,05 0,09 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,02 0,01
Bra -0,10 0,00 -0,06 -0,07 -0,05 -0,04 -0,01 -0,08 0,01 -0,03 0,04 -0,09 -0,02 -0,05 -0,05 -0,08
Chi 0,01 0,05 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,04 -0,03 0,06 0,05 0,07 0,00 0,07 -0,01 0,03 0,02
Cos -0,02 0,07 -0,01 0,00 0,03 0,04 0,06 -0,03 0,07 0,04 0,09 -0,03 0,05 -0,01 0,02 0,03
Dom -0,04 0,05 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,01 -0,04 0,03 0,02 0,07 -0,02 0,03 -0,02 0,00 -0,01
Els -0,10 0,00 -0,09 -0,05 -0,02 0,00 0,02 -0,11 0,03 0,01 0,05 -0,09 -0,03 -0,06 -0,06 -0,04
Gua -0,12 0,00 -0,11 -0,09 -0,05 -0,03 0,00 -0,15 0,01 -0,04 0,03 -0,13 -0,03 -0,08 -0,08 -0,06
Jam -0,03 0,00 0,02 -0,07 -0,02 -0,04 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,03 -0,03 -0,02 0,02 -0,01 -0,02
Hon -0,14 -0,01 -0,13 -0,11 -0,06 -0,04 -0,01 -0,17 0,00 -0,04 0,03 -0,15 -0,04 -0,11 -0,10 -0,07
Mex -0,06 0,03 -0,05 -0,04 -0,02 0,01 0,03 -0,09 0,04 0,00 0,06 -0,07 0,02 -0,03 -0,04 -0,03
Nic -0,12 -0,03 -0,13 -0,08 -0,07 -0,05 -0,03 -0,15 -0,02 -0,05 0,00 -0,12 -0,04 -0,10 -0,08 -0,08
Pan 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,02 0,04 0,03 0,06 -0,02 0,08 0,06 0,10 0,00 0,06 -0,01 0,04 0,02
Par -0,08 0,03 -0,07 -0,01 -0,01 0,02 0,06 -0,11 0,07 0,02 0,08 -0,08 0,00 -0,05 -0,04 -0,03
Per -0,03 0,06 -0,03 0,04 0,03 0,06 0,09 -0,05 0,10 0,06 0,10 -0,02 0,04 0,00 -0,01 0,00
Uru -0,02 0,07 -0,01 0,01 0,02 0,04 0,06 -0,04 0,07 0,04 0,09 -0,03 0,05 -0,01 0,00 0,01
Ven -0,01 0,07 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,05 0,00 0,07 0,06 0,10 0,01 0,06 0,01 0,03 0,0076
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Arg Bra Chi Cos Dom Els Gua Jam Hon Mex Nic Pan Par Per Uru Ven
Arg 0,00 -0,07 -0,09 -0,11 -0,04 -0,11 -0,06 -0,06 -0,09 -0,04 0,00 -0,06 0,03 0,07 -0,05 -0,03
Bra 0,04 0,00 -0,07 -0,04 0,02 -0,03 0,03 -0,06 0,01 0,03 0,07 -0,01 0,13 0,13 0,02 0,01
Chi 0,10 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,05 0,09 0,02 0,08 0,09 0,04 0,15 0,17 0,06 0,09
Cos 0,12 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,08 0,03 0,06 -0,01 0,03 0,08 0,13 0,04 0,20 0,23 0,07 0,09
Dom 0,03 -0,03 -0,07 -0,06 0,00 -0,03 0,01 -0,05 -0,01 0,02 0,05 -0,02 0,11 0,14 0,00 0,00
Els 0,06 -0,01 -0,05 -0,04 0,00 0,00 0,04 -0,06 0,02 0,04 0,08 -0,02 0,15 0,17 0,03 0,01
Gua 0,01 -0,04 -0,12 -0,09 -0,05 -0,05 0,00 -0,10 -0,02 0,00 0,03 -0,06 0,12 0,13 -0,03 -0,03
Jam 0,02 -0,03 -0,10 -0,09 -0,01 -0,09 -0,06 0,00 -0,09 -0,03 0,00 -0,05 0,04 0,08 -0,03 0,01
Hon 0,03 -0,01 -0,09 -0,07 -0,02 -0,03 0,01 -0,09 0,00 0,02 0,05 -0,03 0,14 0,15 -0,01 0,00
Mex 0,02 -0,03 -0,08 -0,08 -0,01 -0,03 -0,01 -0,06 -0,02 0,00 0,05 -0,03 0,11 0,14 -0,01 0,00
Nic -0,03 -0,05 -0,15 -0,12 -0,05 -0,09 -0,03 -0,13 -0,04 -0,03 0,00 -0,08 0,07 0,08 -0,06 -0,05
Pan 0,06 0,00 -0,04 -0,05 0,04 -0,04 -0,01 0,00 -0,03 0,02 0,07 0,00 0,10 0,15 0,01 0,04
Par -0,06 -0,11 -0,15 -0,16 -0,09 -0,16 -0,09 -0,17 -0,11 -0,07 -0,03 -0,12 0,00 0,02 -0,10 -0,08
Per -0,10 -0,12 -0,21 -0,20 -0,12 -0,17 -0,13 -0,11 -0,16 -0,11 -0,08 -0,17 -0,03 0,00 -0,14 -0,11
Uru 0,05 0,00 -0,05 -0,04 0,02 -0,05 0,01 -0,02 -0,02 0,02 0,07 0,01 0,10 0,12 0,00 0,03
Ven 0,04 -0,02 -0,05 -0,04 0,02 -0,02 0,02 -0,02 0,01 0,02 0,07 -0,01 0,11 0,13 0,01 0,00
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
Take the case of Paraguay to illustrate the results in table 23 That 
South American economy has the highest levels of informality under 
both definitions in the sample. If Paraguay manages to change its 
employment structure to mimic a more developed economy like Ar-
gentina, Chile or Uruguay, informality in the labor protection sense 
would fall by around six points. The effect would be much larger if 
Paraguay manages to “copy” the parameters of other countries. For 
instance, informality would fall 33 points by taking the parameters 
of Chile or Uruguay while keeping the same structure of observable 
characteristics. In general, the parameter effects are substantially higher 
than the characteristic effects under the social protection definition of 
informality. The difference in general is not large under the produc-




Table 23.   Decomposition of informality rates. Social protection definition.
Simulated rates
                             Parameters of country…
Arg Bra Chi Els Gua Mex Nic Par Per Uru Ven
Characteristics of 
Arg 0,44 0,32 0,29 0,40 0,48 0,52 0,53 0,66 0,71 0,31 0,38
Bra 0,46 0,32 0,28 0,43 0,48 0,57 0,56 0,71 0,76 0,36 0,35
Chi 0,36 0,22 0,20 0,32 0,38 0,45 0,47 0,64 0,65 0,23 0,28
Els 0,43 0,28 0,25 0,38 0,43 0,52 0,51 0,69 0,73 0,32 0,34
Gua 0,48 0,33 0,29 0,44 0,48 0,56 0,56 0,74 0,79 0,37 0,39
Mex 0,46 0,32 0,28 0,43 0,49 0,53 0,55 0,71 0,76 0,34 0,39
Nic 0,51 0,36 0,31 0,49 0,53 0,61 0,61 0,75 0,80 0,40 0,41
Par 0,52 0,37 0,33 0,47 0,56 0,60 0,59 0,71 0,76 0,38 0,41
Per 0,45 0,31 0,28 0,41 0,48 0,53 0,53 0,67 0,70 0,32 0,38
Uru 0,39 0,28 0,25 0,35 0,44 0,49 0,49 0,63 0,69 0,27 0,32
Ven 0,36 0,24 0,21 0,34 0,39 0,49 0,47 0,65 0,68 0,27 0,28
Characteristics effect
Parameters of country…
Arg Bra Chi Els Gua Mex Nic Par Per Uru Ven
Arg 0,00 0,02 -0,08 -0,01 0,04 0,02 0,07 0,07 0,01 -0,05 -0,08
Bra 0,00 0,00 -0,10 -0,04 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,06 -0,01 -0,04 -0,08
Chi 0,09 0,08 0,00 0,05 0,09 0,08 0,11 0,13 0,08 0,06 0,01
Els 0,03 0,05 -0,06 0,00 0,06 0,06 0,11 0,09 0,03 -0,03 -0,04
Gua 0,00 0,00 -0,09 -0,05 0,00 0,01 0,05 0,09 0,00 -0,04 -0,08
Mex -0,01 0,04 -0,08 -0,01 0,03 0,00 0,08 0,07 -0,01 -0,04 -0,04
Nic -0,08 -0,05 -0,13 -0,09 -0,04 -0,06 0,00 -0,01 -0,07 -0,11 -0,14
Par -0,05 0,00 -0,06 -0,02 0,03 0,00 0,05 0,00 -0,04 -0,08 -0,06
Per 0,01 0,06 -0,05 0,03 0,09 0,06 0,10 0,06 0,00 -0,01 -0,02
Uru 0,04 0,09 -0,04 0,05 0,10 0,07 0,13 0,11 0,05 0,00 0,00
Ven 0,10 0,07 0,00 0,06 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,13 0,10 0,04 0,00
Parameters effect
Parameters of country…
Arg Bra Chi Els Gua Mex Nic Par Per Uru Ven
Arg 0,00 -0,13 -0,15 -0,04 0,04 0,08 0,09 0,22 0,27 -0,13 -0,06
Bra 0,14 0,00 -0,03 0,11 0,16 0,25 0,24 0,39 0,45 0,04 0,03
Chi 0,16 0,02 0,00 0,12 0,19 0,25 0,27 0,44 0,45 0,04 0,08
Els 0,05 -0,10 -0,13 0,00 0,05 0,14 0,13 0,31 0,35 -0,06 -0,04
Gua 0,01 -0,15 -0,19 -0,04 0,00 0,08 0,09 0,27 0,31 -0,11 -0,08
Mex -0,07 -0,21 -0,25 -0,10 -0,04 0,00 0,02 0,18 0,23 -0,19 -0,14
Nic -0,09 -0,25 -0,29 -0,11 -0,08 0,00 0,00 0,15 0,19 -0,20 -0,19
Par -0,19 -0,33 -0,38 -0,24 -0,15 -0,11 -0,12 0,00 0,05 -0,33 -0,30
Per -0,25 -0,39 -0,42 -0,29 -0,22 -0,17 -0,17 -0,03 0,00 -0,38 -0,32
Uru 0,12 0,01 -0,02 0,08 0,16 0,22 0,22 0,36 0,42 0,00 0,05
Ven 0,08 -0,04 -0,07 0,06 0,12 0,21 0,19 0,37 0,41 -0,01 0,00
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).78
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VII. Concluding remarks 
We have presented a general picture of labor informality in Latin 
America and the Caribbean by showing a wide set of statistics for a 
sample of 21 countries. The evidence suggests that there are no signs 
of a consistent pattern of reduction in labor informality in the region in 
the last two decades. Regardless of the definition used, labor informal-
ity remains a pervasive characteristic of labor markets in LAC. The 
evidence of increasing informality both in expansions and downturns 
in several countries is challenging as it calls for explanations that go 
beyond the economic cycle. 
The cross-section evidence seems to be consistent with the idea of 
voluntary self-employment. Unskilled young people enter the labor 
market as wage earners, accumulate knowledge, capital and contacts, 
and then set up their own informal businesses. However, on average, 
being informal implies lower wages, even when controlling for observ-
able factors. Informal male workers without a secondary education on 
average earn 30% less than their formal counterparts. Accordingly, 
in all countries the difference in the poverty headcount ratio between 
informal and formal workers is sizeable. In most countries informal 
workers have lost ground against their formal counterparts in terms 
of hours of work, but not in terms of hourly wages.
In several countries the increase in labor informality, as defined by the 
lack of social protection, seems to have been associated to a sizeable 
increase in the propensity to informality in most groups. The same 
conclusion arises when comparing labor informality across countries. 
Understanding differences in informality over time and across coun-
tries seems to be much more complicated than accounting for different 
labor structures. 
The legalistic or social protection definition of informality is prob-
ably the most interesting to study, and the most relevant for many 
policy issues. One way to learn about labor informality in this sense 
is by comparing country experiences on social protection. Although 
certainly subject to many caveats, the country comparisons are often 
in practice the most compelling pieces of evidence over economic 




contained in the LAC household surveys is still scarce, heterogeneous 
and volatile. A generalized effort toward a better and more homogene-
ous coverage of social protection issues in household surveys would 
surely be socially very productive. 
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